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Ad Law Incarcerated
Giovanna Shay †

INTRODUCTION: THE REGULATION OF “MASS INCARCERATION” 1
The United States has over two million prisoners, 2 the largest incarcerated
population worldwide. 3 Our nation has been described as a “carceral state”
with a policy of “mass imprisonment,” 4 and our vast prison system has been
termed a “prison industrial complex.” 5 Massive growth in the prison
†
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1. The term “mass incarceration” has entered the lexicon to describe the unprecedented use
of incarceration in the United States. See, e.g., MARIE GOTTSCHALK, THE PRISON AND THE
GALLOWS: THE POLITICS OF MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA (2006). See also JEREMY
TRAVIS, BUT THEY ALL COME BACK: FACING THE CHALLENGES OF PRISONER REENTRY xix
(2005) (describing “mass incarceration” as “a phrase used by a number of commentators”).
2. The Sentencing Project, News - Incarceration (2008), http://www.sentencingproject.org/
template/page.cfm?id=107.
3. PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, ONE IN 100: BEHIND BARS IN AMERICA 2008 5 (2008)
(“[M]ore than 1 in 100 adults is now locked up in America.”); Adam Liptak, Inmate Count in U.S.
Dwarfs Other Nations, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2008, at A1.
4. See, e.g., GOTTSCHALK, supra note 1, at 1-17.
5. Craig Haney, Counting Casualties in the War on Prisoners, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 87, 88 n.5
(Summer 2008). See also RUTH WILSON GILMORE, GOLDEN GULAG: PRISONS, SURPLUS, CRISIS,
AND OPPOSITION IN GLOBALIZING CALIFORNIA 7 (2007) [hereinafter, “GILMORE, GOLDEN
GULAG”] (situating the 500% increase in California’s prison population between 1982 and 2000 in

329

330

BERKELEY JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW

[Vol. 14:329

population over the last thirty years has had a severely disparate racial impact. 6
The devastating effects of mass incarceration—on prisoners, their families, and
Some commentators have
communities—have been well-documented. 7
suggested that the “prison-industrial complex” is the most recent in a series of
regimes that have maintained racial subordination—an extension of slavery and
de jure segregation, 8 and a means of controlling the “remnants of the black
ghetto.” 9
This Article examines one part of the legal regime administering “mass
incarceration” that has not been a focus of legal scholarship: prison and jail
policies and regulation. Prison and jail regulation is the administrative law of
the “carceral state,” 10 governing an incarcerated population of millions, a
majority of whom are people of color. 11 The result is an extremely regressive
form of policy-making, affecting poor communities and communities of color
most directly. 12 Indeed, if “the category of ‘inmate’ in the United States today
California’s changing political economy).
6. MARC MAUER & RYAN S. KING, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, UNEVEN JUSTICE: STATE
RATES OF INCARCERATION BY RACE AND ETHNICITY 1 (July 2007) (“If current trends continue,
one in three black males born today can expect to spend time in prison during his lifetime.”).
While recent statistics show that the number of African-Americans serving time in state prisons
for drug offenses fell 21.6% between 1999-2005, two-thirds of the people serving time in state
institutions for drug crimes are African-Americans or Latinos. MARC MAUER, THE SENTENCING
PROJECT, THE CHANGING RACIAL DYNAMICS OF THE WAR ON DRUGS 1-3 (2009).
7. See INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS
IMPRISONMENT (Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002) [hereinafter “INVISIBLE
PUNISHMENT”]; Nekima Levy-Pounds, From the Frying Pan Into the Fire: How Poor Women of
Color and Children Are Affected by Sentencing Guidelines and Mandatory Minimums, 47 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 285, 298 (2007) (“[W]hile African-Americans make up roughly thirteen percent
of our nation’s population, African-American women account for thirty-five percent of the federal
female prison population and forty-eight percent of state female prison populations.”); Tracey
Meares, Social Organization and Drug Law Enforcement, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 191 (1998);
Dorothy Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in African American
Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271 (2004).
8. ANGELA Y. DAVIS, ARE PRISONS OBSOLETE? 22-39 (2003) (making a connection
between slavery and the penitentiary in the United States, including the convict-lease system and
“Black codes”); Kim Shayo Buchanan, Impunity: Sexual Abuse in Women’s Prisons, 42 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 45, 48-49, 55-60 (2007) (drawing on Reva Siegel’s theory of status regime
modernization to connect rape of African-American women in slavery to custodial sexual abuse of
women prisoners); Loic Wacquant, From Slavery to Mass Incarceration, 13 NEW LEFT REV. 41
(Jan.-Feb. 2002) [hereinafter “Wacquant, From Slavery to Mass Incarceration”] (writing that
“slavery and mass imprisonment are genealogically linked”); Loic Wacquant, The New ‘Peculiar
Institution:’ On the Prison as a Surrogate Ghetto, 4 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 377 (Aug.
2000) [hereinafter “Wacquant, Peculiar Institution”].
9. Loic Wacquant in RACE, INCARCERATION, AND AMERICAN VALUES 57, 61-62 (Glenn
Loury ed., 2008) [hereinafter: “RACE, INCARCERATION”].
10. Cf. GOTTSCHALK, supra note 1, at 1 (describing “the construction of the carceral state in
America”).
11. HEATHER C. WEST & WILLIAM J. SABOL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISON
INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2008-STATISTICAL TABLES 17 (2009), available at
http://www.ojp.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/pim08st.pdf (At mid-year 2008, sixty percent of 2,103,500
inmates in state or federal prisons, or in local jails, were Black or Hispanic.).
12. Cf. Gia B. Lee, First Amendment Enforcement in Government Institutions and
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. . . [is] a racialized one,” 13 corrections regulation may be conceived as a kind
of racialized law-making. Although it has disparate impact, however, its
effects extend beyond the communities most affected.
Corrections policies govern every area of prison life and many issues
affecting prisoners’ families and neighborhoods. These include: medical and
mental health care, visitation, telephone usage, mail, access to lawyers, sexual
abuse policies, and programming such as vocational and educational courses.
Some rules decide tremendously personal issues relating to core definitions of
self. For example, corrections policies determine who is counted in a
prisoner’s “family,” and thus may visit, 14 and whether a prisoner is deemed
male or female for housing purposes. 15 Other policies, such as those regarding
release and reentry, can have an important aggregate effect on free
communities. With about 700,000 prisoners returning home annually, 16 many
of them going to concentrated areas of only a few city blocks, such rules can
have a great impact on poor neighborhoods. 17
Despite its importance, the area of corrections regulation is a kind of “noman’s land.” In many jurisdictions, and in many subject areas, prison and jail
regulations are formulated outside of public view. Because of the deference
afforded prison and jail officials under prevailing constitutional standards, such
regulations are not given extensive judicial attention. Nor do they receive
much focus in the scholarly literature. 18 The purpose of this Article is to

Programs, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1691, 1715, 1738-45 (2009) (arguing for a “free speech conditional
deference model,” in which courts defer only to formal speech policies in prisons and other
governmental institutions, in part because, “about one in three Black males in the United States
will go to prison during his lifetime,” and “[i]n light of these numbers, it is clear that the nature
and extent of speech rights within government institutions has a widespread, and sometimes
severe or disproportionate, impact on the abilities of our nation’s communities to pursue
autonomy and self-fulfillment”).
13. Sharon Dolovich, Incarceration American-Style, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 237, 255
(2009) [hereinafter “Dolovich, Incarceration American-Style”]. See also Glenn C. Loury in
RACE, INCARCERATION, supra note 9, at 36-37.
14. Kacy Elizabeth Wiggum, Defining Family in American Prisons, 30 WOMEN’S RTS. L.
REP. 357 (2009).
15. See D.C. Dep’t of Corr., Gender Classification and Housing, Program Statement No.
4020.3 (Feb. 20, 2009) (“DOC shall classify an inmate who has male genitals as a male and one
who has female genitals as a female, unless otherwise classified by the Transgender Committee
consistent with this policy.”).
16. KAMELA MALLIK-KANE & CHRISTY VISHER, HEALTH & PRISONER REENTRY: HOW
PHYSICAL, MENTAL & SUBSTANCE ABUSE CONDITIONS SHAPE THE PROCESS OF REINTEGRATION
1 (2008).
17. ERIC CADORA, CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES: AN
EXPLORATION OF OVERLAPPING NEEDS, RESOURCES AND INTERESTS IN BROOKLYN
NEIGHBORHOODS (2002). See also Margaret E. Finzen, Systems of Oppression: The Collateral
Consequences of Incarceration and Their Effects on Black Communities, 12 GEO. J. ON POVERTY
L. & POL’Y 299, 320 (2005).
18. See Jonathan Simon, The ‘Society of Captives’ in the Era of Hyper-Incarceration, 4
THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 285, 289 (Aug. 2000) (noting that “studies of prison social
organization” have become less common “precisely during the time of the great expansion of
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accord prison and jail regulation more sustained attention. Specifically, it
argues that corrections policies should be subject to notice-and-comment
rulemaking procedures, to promote transparency and democratic participation.
Alternatively, courts should scrutinize regulations that are not promulgated
pursuant to notice-and-comment rulemaking more carefully.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I first sketches the history of
court involvement in prison reform, explaining that prison litigation made
institutions more bureaucratic and increased the importance of corrections
policies. It then outlines how the legal standards by which courts currently
judge corrections policies extend deference to prison officials. Part II discusses
the extent to which corrections policies are exempt from state administrative
procedure acts: In many states, corrections regulations are exempt or partially
exempt from the provisions of state administrative procedure acts. This Part
then describes how both prisoners and free communities are affected by
corrections policies. Part III argues that, because of this impact, corrections
regulations should be subject to notice-and-comment rulemaking or, in the
alternative, should be scrutinized more carefully by courts.
I. COURTS AND PRISON REGULATION
A. Litigation and Bureaucratization
The story of prison regulation is best understood against the backdrop of
prison reform efforts. 19 As corrections systems responded to litigation in the
1970s by becoming more bureaucratized, prison regulation became more
important. 20 After significant victories in the 1970s and early 1980s,21
however, so-called “structural reform” 22 prison litigation was restricted by
incarceration”). A few commentators, notably in recent years Professor Rachel Barkow, have
considered the application of administrative law concepts to criminal justice agencies. See Rachel
Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715, 721 n.4 (2005) (focusing on the design of
sentencing commissions: “[w]hile scholars have analyzed the structure and design of agencies in a
multitude of areas, the agencies responsible for criminal justice policy have commanded far less
attention”); Rachel Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons From
Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869 (2009) (analyzing how administrative law principles
could be used to check prosecutorial discretion); Rachel Barkow, The Ascent of the Administrative
State and the Demise of Mercy, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1332 (discussing how the rise of the
administrative law paradigm depressed use of jury nullification and executive clemency); Marya
P. McDonald, A Multidimensional Look at the Gender Crisis in the Correctional System, 15 LAW
& INEQ. 505, 535-44 (1997) (arguing that applying administrative law principles to review
corrections officials’ actions is a good way to address unequal programming in women’s prisons).
19. See infra notes 21-80 and accompanying text.
20. Id.
21. See MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE
MODERN STATE 39-46 (1998).
22. OWEN M. FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 9-10 (1978) (describing use of
“structural injunction” as “seeking to effectuate the reform of a social institution”). See also
Malcolm M. Feeley & Roger A. Hanson, The Impact of Judicial Intervention on Prisons and
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judge-made doctrines 23 and, most decisively, by the 1996 Prison Litigation
Reform Act (“PLRA”). 24 This transformation occurred under the guise of
deference to an increasingly professionalized corrections establishment. While
courts previously adopted an explicit “hands-off” policy towards prisons, 25
they now deferred to corrections authorities’ expertise. 26 Today, the resultant
lack of scrutiny of corrections policies further reinforces the race and class
hierarchies of mass incarceration. 27
However, courts’ deference to prison and jail rules is not finely calibrated.
Judicial opinions often refer to corrections policies as if they are a monolithic
block of regulations made through uniform processes. 28 In reality, the category
of administrative documents containing corrections policies encompasses a
wide-range of edicts, ranging from full-fledged state regulations subject to
notice-and-comment rulemaking to informal memoranda circulated by sheriffs.
When courts defer to corrections officials and their policies, they are deferring
to judgments that are often unchecked by the type of rulemaking procedures
that are the norm in other contexts.
Until the 1960s, federal courts adopted a “hands-off doctrine” with respect
to prison and jail litigation. 29 Courts believed they were powerless “to
supervise prison administration or to interfere with the ordinary prison rules or
regulations.” 30 This “hands-off” attitude was a combination of “procedural and
Jails: A Framework for Analysis and a Review of the Literature, in COURTS, CORRECTIONS, AND
THE CONSTITUTION: THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL INTERVENTION ON PRISONS AND JAILS 12, 15
(John J. DiIulio, Jr. ed., 1990) (discussing Fiss’s concept of “structural reform” litigation).
23. FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 21, at 46-50.
24. Id. at 382-83. The PLRA is codified in several different parts of the U.S. Code. Pub. L.
No. 104-134, §§ 801-10, 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-66-77 (1996) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 523 (2004);
18 U.S.C. §§ 3624, 3626 (2008); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1915, 1915A, 1932 (2003); 42 U.S.C. §§
1997a-1997h (2009)).
25. See Note, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review the
Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506, 508 (1963) [hereinafter “Beyond the Ken”].
26. See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
27. See Buchanan, supra note 8, at 86; Michael B. Mushlin & Naomi Roslyn Galtz, Getting
Real About Race and Prisoner Rights, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 27 (2009).
28. See, e.g., Turner, 482 U.S. 78.
29. See James B. Jacobs, The Prisoners’ Rights Movement and Its Impacts, 1960-80, in
NORVAL MORRIS & MICHAEL TONRY, CRIME AND JUSTICE: AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH
429, 433 (1980) [hereinafter “Jacobs, The Prisoners’ Rights Movement”] (“Until the 1960s the
federal judiciary adhered to a ‘hands off’ attitude toward prison cases out of concern for
federalism and separation of powers and a fear that judicial review of administrative decisions
would undermine prison security and discipline.”); Ira P. Robbins, The Cry of Wolfish in the
Federal Courts: The Future of Federal Judicial Intervention in Prison Administration, 71 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 211, 211-13 (1980). See also Beyond the Ken, supra note 25, at 508, cited in
Allison Brill, Rights Without Remedy: The Myth of State Court Accessibility After the Prison
Litigation Reform Act, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 645, 652-53 (2008). But see Alexander Reinert,
Eighth Amendment Gaps: Can Conditions of Confinement Litigation Benefit From Proportionality
Theory?, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 53, 59-60 (2009) (collecting cases in which state courts, relying
on state law provisions, invalidated sentences as “cruel and unusual”).
30. Beyond the Ken, supra note 25, at 506 (quoting Banning v. Looney, 213 F.2d 771 (10th
Cir. 1954)).

334

BERKELEY JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW

[Vol. 14:329

substantive” legal doctrines. 31 For example, one of the most important vehicles
for prisoners’ suits is the civil rights statute 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 32 Until Monroe
v. Pape in 1961, 33 courts interpreted the “under color of state law” language of
the civil rights statute 42 U.S.C. § 1983 not to provide a cause of action for
abuses that violated state law, 34 and until the 1960s, prisoner complaints were
also routinely thrown out because courts concluded that the Eighth Amendment
did not bind the states. 35 Federal courts were also reluctant to intervene in
prison-related matters based on concerns relating to federalism (in the case of
state prisons), 36 separation of powers (when dealing with federal prisons), 37 or
subverting prison discipline (in both). 38 As a result, courts declined to get
involved, 39 even when prisoners alleged being “threatened, abused, [and]
deprived of meals,” 40 being “placed in a barren cell for a period of almost three
months,” 41 or being wrongfully transferred to a mental institution. 42
The Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s and 70s brought about changes
both in courts’ attitudes and formal doctrine. 43 It also initiated a period of class
action litigation that reformed prisons and jails. 44 Continuing through the early
1980s, this first wave of prison litigation brought major victories for prisoners,
eliminating reliance on inmate “trusties” (prisoners entrusted with authority
over other inmates), brutal corporal punishment, and inhumane living
conditions. 45 In the ten years following the first important prison case, prison
31. FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 21, at 31.
32. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2007) (“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress . . . .”). See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 480 (1994) (describing §
1983 as one of “the two most fertile sources of federal-court prisoner litigation”).
33. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
34. FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 21, at 32, 37.
35. Id. at 33-34.
36. Id. at 34.
37. Id. at 34. See also Beyond the Ken, supra note 25, at 515.
38. Beyond the Ken, supra note 25, at 516-17.
39. Id. at 508-09 & n.12.
40. Curtis v. Jacques, 130 F.Supp. 920, 921 (W.D. Mich. 1954) (“The law is well established
that Federal courts do not have the power, and that it is not their function or responsibility, to
control or regulate the management of State prisons and the treatment and disciplining of
prisoners, or to interfere with the conduct of State prisons by State authorities.”).
41. Williams v. Steele, 194 F.2d 32, 33-34 (8th Cir. 1952) (“[T]he courts have no power to
supervise the discipline of the prisoners nor to interfere with their discipline, but only on habeas
corpus to deliver from prison those who are illegally detained.”).
42. In re Taylor, 187 F.2d 852, 853 (9th Cir. 1951) (“It is not within the province of the
courts to supervise the treatment of prisoners in federal penitentiaries.”).
43. FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 21, at 39.
44. Id. at 34-46; Margo Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions Over Time: A Case Study of Jail
and Prison Court Orders, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 550, 558-64 (2006) [hereinafter “Schlanger, Civil
Rights Injunctions”].
45. FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 21, at 51-73, 367. See also Schlanger, Civil Rights
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conditions in some thirty-three jurisdictions were declared unconstitutional. 46
One major aspect of the civil rights reforms was the increased
bureaucratization of prison systems. 47 Professional standards became more
important, both as the benchmark used by courts and advocates to evaluate
prison conditions and as a guide for prison officials seeking to avoid lawsuits.48
“Written policies and procedures could be offered in court proceedings as
deserving of deference, because they were at least rational . . . .” 49 As a result,
“the operations of prisons and jails throughout the country are now governed by
a[n] amalgam of statutes, regulations, and guidelines and are subject to greater
accountability.” 50
Prison litigation also professionalized corrections management. 51 Courtenforced settlements, known as consent decrees, “professionalized and
bureaucratized by the terms they imposed, but also by their impact on who was
interested in becoming or qualified to become an administrator.” 52 A “new
generation” of corrections administrators emerged, with a more professional,
“nationally oriented correctional perspective.” 53
With so many state prison systems under some form of consent decree, 54 a

Injunctions, supra note 44, at 563-64 (writing that “among the areas affected were staffing, the
amount of space per inmate, medical and mental health care, food, hygiene, sanitation,
disciplinary procedures, conditions in disciplinary segregation, exercise, fire safety, inmate
classification, grievance policies, race discrimination, sex discrimination, religious discrimination
and accommodations, and disability discrimination and accommodations”).
46. FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 21, at 39-40.
47. Jacobs, The Prisoners’ Rights Movement, supra note 29, at 458 (“The prisoners’ rights
movement has contributed to the bureaucratization of the prison.”).
48. Susan Sturm, The Legacy and Future of Corrections Litigation, in INCARCERATING
CRIMINALS: PRISONS AND JAILS IN SOCIAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL CONTEXT 48 (Timothy J.
Flanagan, James W. Marquart & Kenneth G. Adams eds., 1998). See also FEELEY & RUBIN,
supra note 21, at 162-63.
49. Margo Schlanger, Operationalizing Deterrence: Claims Management (in Hospitals, a
Large Retailer, and Jails and Prisons), 2 J. OF TORT LAW 1, 46 (2008).
50. Feeley & Hanson, supra note 22, at 26.
51. Malcolm M. Feeley & Van Swearingen, The Prison Conditions Cases and the
Bureaucratization of American Corrections: Influences, Impacts and Implications, 24 PACE L.
REV. 433, 435-36, 438 (2004).
52. Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions, supra note 44, at 563. See also JAMES B. JACOBS,
STATEVILLE: THE PENITENTIARY IN MASS SOCIETY 73-104 (1977) (describing the “emergence of
a professional administration” in the early 1970s at the Stateville Penitentiary in Illinois, including
professionalization of the staff, the enactment of administrative regulations, and bureaucratization
of the corrections agency); Feeley & Swearingen, supra note 51, at 455-65 (“[L]itigation
promoted professionalization and facilitated opportunities for a new generation of
administrators.”).
53. FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 21, at 370. See also Feeley & Hanson, supra note 22, at
27 (discussing the role of correctional accreditation organizations); Vincent Nathan, Have the
Courts Made A Difference in the Quality of Prison Conditions? What Have We Accomplished to
Date?, 24 PACE L. REV. 419, 424 (2004) (“[J]udicial intervention has had a vast impact on the
thinking and the mindset of correction administrators, as well as that of mid-level and line staff.”).
54. FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 21, at 39-40.
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reaction to federal court intervention followed. 55 In the 1980s and 1990s, the
Supreme Court issued a number of opinions that were less prisoner-friendly, 56
and the Department of Justice under the administrations of Presidents Ronald
Reagan and George H. W. Bush settled cases on terms unfavorable to
prisoners. 57 In the PLRA, Congress decisively constrained prisoners’ rights
litigation 58 through restrictions on prospective relief, 59 consent decrees, 60 pro
se filings, 61 and attorney’s fees. 62 An invigorated exhaustion requirement 63
and a limitation on damages without a prior showing of a physical injury
reduced claims further. 64
By the 1990s, a consensus had emerged that prison and jail litigation was
The conventional wisdom was that the increasingly
“moribund.” 65
conservative federal bench had restricted such litigation through judge-made
doctrines, which were ultimately codified by the PLRA. 66 In her empirical
study of court filings, Margo Schlanger challenges this account, arguing that
prison and jail litigation essentially remained steady through the late 1980s and
early 1990s, before falling markedly only after Congress passed the PLRA. 67
Whichever version one accepts, the broad outline of the story remains the
same: The long-standing “hands-off” doctrine was interrupted by a period of
significant gains through civil rights litigation, followed by restrictions on such
litigation. 68
Meanwhile, the prison population boomed. The number of incarcerated
Americans increased by a factor of seven between 1970 and 2007, resulting in
1 of every 131 Americans being incarcerated in prison or jail by mid-year
55. Id. at 46-50 (describing the prison reform movement as “in retreat” since 1986).
56. Id. at 48-49 (discussing Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981), which concluded that
double-celling was not, in and of itself, an Eighth Amendment violation, and Wilson v. Seiter, 501
U.S. 294 (1991), which held that an Eighth Amendment violation in the context of a prison riot
required that the guard act “maliciously and sadistically”).
57. Id. at 49-50.
58. Id. at 50. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NO EQUAL JUSTICE 8 (2009) (“The PLRA
brought sweeping and unprecedented changes in the ability of prisoners to seek relief in court
from conditions that threaten their health and safety or otherwise violate their legal rights.”).
59. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) (2008).
60. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(1), (b)(3) (2008).
61. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), (g) (2003).
62. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d) (2009).
63. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2009).
64. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (2009).
65. Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions, supra note 44, at 557-58, 566.
66. Id. at 566-67 (citing Mark Tushnet & Larry Yackle, Symbolic Statutes and Real Laws:
The Pathologies of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, 47 DUKE L.J. 1, 21 (1997)) (Professor Schlanger disputes the traditional account that
the PLRA “had already limited the availability of relief to prison and jail plaintiffs and allowed
institutional defendants various ways out of entered decrees”).
67. Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions, supra note 44, at 589.
68. See generally Susan N. Herman, Slashing and Burning Prisoners’ Rights: Congress and
the Supreme Court in Dialogue, 77 OR. L. REV. 1229 (1998) (describing restrictions on prisoners’
rights by both the Supreme Court and Congress in the PLRA).
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2007. 69 The causes of this expansion are much debated, but probably include
the so-called war on drugs and other law-and-order initiatives, longer prison
terms produced by sentencing reform, and victims’ rights movements. 70
During this prison boom, the racial composition of America’s prisons and
jails changed from majority white to largely African-American and Latino. 71
Commentators have noted that this change “coincided with” the “shift toward
constitutional deference” in prisoners’ rights doctrine. 72 The racially disparate
nature of mass incarceration leads Loic Wacquant to argue that it is better
termed “the hyper-incarceration of one particular category: lower-class black
men in the crumbling ghetto.” 73 Some draw a direct connection between the
end of de jure segregation and the subsequent incarceration boom, arguing that
the prison has become a “juridical ghetto.” 74
Prisons also changed in ways that were consistent with the
bureaucratization of the system and the vast numbers of people incarcerated.
Some systems continued to struggle with “old-fashioned” abuses, sub-standard
conditions, and inadequate medical care. 75 But in other systems, inhumanity
evolved, in part due to the rationalization of reform efforts. 76 Technologically
advanced “supermax” prisons imposed solitary confinement 77 “through the use
69. The Sentencing Project, News - Incarceration (2008), http://www.sentencingproject.org/
template/page.cfm?id=107.
70. See GOTTSCHALK, supra note 1, at 2, 18-40.
71. Wacquant in RACE, INCARCERATION, supra note 9, at 60 (writing that U.S. prisoners
were 70% white and 30% “other” at the end of World War II, and 70% African-American and
Latino and 30% white by 2000).
72. Buchanan, supra note 8, at 81. See Loury, in RACE, INCARCERATION, supra note 9, at
13 (explaining that, beginning in the late 1960s, “opponents of the civil rights revolution sought to
regain the upper hand by shifting to a new issue . . . a seemingly race-neutral concern over
crime”).
73. Wacquant, in RACE, INCARCERATION, supra note 9, at 59.
74. Dolovich, Incarceration American-Style, supra note 13, at 255-56 (quoting Wacquant,
Peculiar Institution, supra note 8, at 383-84).
75. See Prison Abuse Remedies Act of 2007: Hearing on H.R. 4109 Before the Subcomm.
on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 17-19
(2008) (testimony of Stephen B. Bright), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Brig
ht080422.pdf. See also Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002) (concluding that restraining an
inmate to a hitching post was an Eighth Amendment violation).
76. Jacobs, The Prisoners’ Rights Movement, supra note 29, at 462 (noting that “[l]ess
punitive but possibly more intrusive mechanisms of control are now becoming more popular—
closed circuit televisions, more frequent use of tear gas, sophisticated locking systems, and unit
management which seeks to limit inmate movement and contact”).
77. ALAN ELSNER, GATES OF INJUSTICE 154-55 (2004). See Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S.
209 (2005) (describing “extreme isolation” in an Ohio supermax facility and concluding that
prisoners possess a liberty interest in avoiding assignment there). See also James Forman, Jr.,
Exporting Harshness: How the War on Crime Has Made the War on Terror Possible, 33 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 331, 350-351 (2009) (making a connection between the abusive
conditions at Guantanamo Bay and the development of domestic supermax prisons); MikelMeredith Weidman, The Culture of Judicial Deference and the Problem of Supermax Prisons, 51
UCLA L. REV. 1505, 1512, 1526 (describing how “the typical supermax minimizes sensory
stimulation and human contact” and how “[t]he Supreme Court has been particularly active in
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of electronic surveillance, specially designed cell units and blocks, and rigidly
organized protocols for staff communication with inmates.” 78 One former
warden of a supermax has described such a facility as a “clean version of
hell.” 79 Even in traditional prisons, routine imposition of arguably abusive but
bureaucratically rationalized practices—such as strip and body cavity
searches—routinized degradation. 80
Viewed in the long-term, the arc of this story reflects continuity as well as
change. Although structural prison litigation undeniably has achieved
important victories, 81 the legal regimes that govern “mass incarceration” also
illustrate aspects of what Reva Siegel has described as “preservation through
transformation” or “status regime . . . modernization.” 82 Siegel wrote that
formal legal doctrines sanctioning spousal abuse, such as the “right of
chastisement,” were abandoned in the nineteenth-century; but these doctrines
were replaced by judicial rhetoric that preserved the status quo by emphasizing
the sanctity of the home and that declined to intervene in domestic disputes. 83
She explains that “rules and reasons” of a legal system may be modified “to
produce a new regime” that, although “formally distinguishable from its
predecessor,” maintains existing status hierarchies. 84 In other words, when
challenged by reform efforts, legal constructs may morph to preserve race and
gender hierarchies. 85 Siegel concludes, “If a reform movement is at all
successful in advancing its justice claims, it will bring pressure to bear on law
makers to rationalize status-enforcing state action in new and less socially

developing standards of deference to constrain lower courts in prison cases”).
78. Simon, supra note 18, at 300-01 (citing Roy D. King, The Rise and Rise of the
Supermax: An American Solution in Search of a Problem, 1 PUNISHMENT AND SOC’Y 163 (Oct.
1999)).
79. Comments of Robert Hood, former Warden at Florence, Colorado, federal
Administrative Maximum facility, to CBS 60 Minutes, quoted in Jules Lobel, Prolonged Solitary
Confinement and the Constitution, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 115, 116 (2008).
80. See DAVIS, supra note 8, at 63, 81 (arguing that “[s]exual abuse is surreptitiously
incorporated into one of the most habitual aspects of women’s imprisonment, the strip search”).
My thinking on this point was affected by comments by Cynthia Chandler, Executive Director of
Justice Now, at the Feminist Legal Theory Workshop at Emory University, February 27-28, 2009.
Cf. DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY 243 (1990) (recognizing that what
separates incarceration from corporal punishment “is not a matter of the intrinsic levels of pain
and brutality involved,” but rather “the form which that violence takes, and the extent to which it
impinges on public sensibilities”).
81. Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions, supra note 44, at 563-64.
82. Reva B. Siegel, The Rule of Love: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE
L.J. 2117, 2119-20 (1996). See also Buchanan, supra note 8, at 48-49 (applying Siegel’s theory
of status regime modernization in the context of legal regimes countenancing sexual abuse of
incarcerated women of color).
83. Siegel, supra note 82, at 2153 (“As courts addressed the regulation of marital violence in
the wake of chastisement’s demise, judges raised concerns about invading the privacy of the
marriage relationship . . . .”).
84. Id. at 2180.
85. Id.
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controversial terms.” 86
The concept of status regime modernization operates on a number of
levels in the story of prison reform. First, mass incarceration and the legal
regimes that govern it perpetuate status hierarchies of race, class, and gender
that previously were supported by other social and legal institutions. 87 On
another level, status regime modernization explains the story of prison reform
over the last forty years; following a brief period of gains, new legal strictures
have pushed us back in the direction of a “hands-off” approach. 88 Although
courts may have rejected the formal doctrines underpinning the “hands-off”
posture, deference to corrections officials and to their regulations has become
the most recent incarnation of the “hands-off” policy. 89 Because of the racially
disparate impact of mass incarceration, this updated “hands-off” policy now
maintains status regimes of race and class.
B. Deference
Supreme Court case law defers to corrections officials and their policies;
indeed, the Court treats prison and jail regulations as an undifferentiated
monolith, according them deference without asking how they are formulated. 90
86. Id. at 2120.
87. See DAVIS, supra note 8, at 26 (identifying “the historical links between U.S. slavery and
the early penitentiary system”); Wacquant, From Slavery to Mass Incarceration, supra note 8;
Wacquant, Peculiar Institution, supra note 8; Loury, in RACE, INCARCERATION, supra note 9, at
36-37. See also Buchanan, supra note 8, at 49-50 (“The rationales, rules and results of
contemporary prison law impunity evoke women’s exposure to sexual and gender violence under
19th century status regimes that contemporary courts and legislatures have long purported to
reject.”).
88. Elizabeth Budnitz, Not a Part of Her Sentence: Applying the Supreme Court’s Johnson
v. California to Prison Abortion Policies, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 1291, 1305 (2006) (concluding that
Turner produced “a return to the earlier hands-off doctrine that paid vast deference to prison
officials in determining prison policy”); Cheryl Dunn Giles, Turner v. Safley and Its Progeny: A
Gradual Retreat to the “Hands-Off Doctrine?”, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 219, 220 (1993) (arguing six
years after Turner that the Supreme Court’s lax application of the standard was “a step backwards
toward the historical ‘hands-off’ approach”).
89. At various junctures beginning in the late 1970s, and continuing through the 1990s,
commentators have claimed that successive, increasingly harsh restrictions on prisoners’
substantive or procedural rights constitute a “return to” or a “new” “hands-off” doctrine. See
Budnitz, supra note 88; Giles, supra note 88. See also Mark Berger, Withdrawal of Rights and
Due Deference: The New Hands Off Policy in Correctional Litigation, 47 UMKC L. REV. 1, 2
(1979) (explaining how courts replaced the “hands-off” doctrine with limitations on prisoners’
substantive rights); Robbins, supra note 29, at 215 (arguing that Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520
(1979), “reviv[ed] many aspects of the hands-off doctrine” through “judicial deference” to
corrections authorities, signaling the “emergence of a new hands-off approach”).
90. Cf. Lorijean Golichowski Dei, The New Standard of Review for Prisoners’ Rights: A
“Turner” for the Worse?, 33 VILL. L. REV. 393, 436 (1988) (noting that “the standard’s heavy
emphasis on deference robs it of most of its bite” and that it is “to be applied uniformly to the
whole range of challenges”); Richard H. Fallon, Judicially Manageable Standards and
Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1274, 1301-03 (2006) (noting that the Supreme Court
“has mandated a relaxed application even of this loose [Turner] standard” and that this
demonstrates a sense that judges are ill-suited to conduct a cost-benefit analysis of prison
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In its 1987 decision in Turner v. Safley, 91 the Supreme Court articulated what is
by now its familiar test for determining when a prison regulation that impinges
on prisoners’ constitutional rights passes muster. While courts rigorously
scrutinize regulations that may implicate constitutional rights in other
administrative law areas, 92 in the prison context, courts defer even to
regulations that impinge on constitutional rights.
Writing for the Court in Turner, Justice O’Connor surveyed prior case law
regarding restrictions on prison unions, face-to-face visits with the media, and
receipt of hardback books. 93 She wrote that “[p]rison walls do not form a
barrier separating prison inmates from the protections of the Constitution.” 94
Nonetheless, she also recognized that “[r]unning a prison is an inordinately
difficult undertaking that requires expertise, planning, and the commitment of
resources, all of which are peculiarly within the province of the legislative and
executive branches of government.” 95 Particularly when a state prison system
is involved, she wrote, “federal courts have . . . additional reason to accord
deference to the appropriate prison authorities.” 96
Justice O’Connor concluded that “when a prison regulation impinges on
inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related
to legitimate penological interests.” 97 She then set out the four factor test that
has governed so much of prison litigation for the last twenty years: (1) whether
there is a “valid, rational connection between the prison regulation and the
legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it;” (2) “whether there
[are] alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to prison
inmates;” (3) “the impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional right
will have on guards and other inmates;” and (4) “whether there are ‘ready
alternatives’ to the regulation.” 98 Applying this test in Turner itself, the Court
struck down restrictions on inmate marriage, 99 describing the social
significance of marriage. 100 However, Turner upheld restrictions on inmate-tolitigation in the aggregate); James E. Robertson, The Majority Opinion as the Social Construction
of Reality: The Supreme Court and Prison Rules, 53 OKLA. L. REV. 161 (2000) [hereinafter
“Robertson, The Majority Opinion”] (discussing the Turner test and arguing that “the Supreme
Court has constructed as social reality a set of assumptions about imprisonment that renders
inmates unworthy of meaningful constitutional safeguards”); James E. Robertson, The Rehnquist
Court and the “Turnerization” of Prisoners’ Rights, 10 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 97, 121-22 (2006)
[hereinafter “Robertson, The Rehnquist Court”].
91. Turner, 482 U.S. at 78.
92. See infra note 278.
93. Turner, 482 U.S. at 85-90.
94. Id. at 84.
95. Id. at 85.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 89.
98. Id. at 89-91.
99. Id. at 94.
100. See Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 417 (Conn. 2008) (relying on
Turner to describe the social significance of marriage).
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inmate correspondence, citing security concerns. 101
The Turner test—the primary federal constitutional standard associated
with challenges to prison and jail regulations—thus emphasizes deference to
prison officials and the relative technical and administrative expertise of
corrections authorities. It also acknowledges the “intractable” problems of
prison administration and the comity concerns associated with federal judicial
intervention in state court systems. 102 The Court has applied Turner in a way
that defers to corrections regulations as well; apart from overriding the
restriction on inmate marriage in Turner itself, the Supreme Court has never
invalidated a prison regulation analyzed under the test. 103
Significantly, the Turner test does not require courts to differentiate
among types of prison and jail regulations, policies, and rules, creating a onesize-fits-all approach. As a result, lower courts apply Turner both in cases
involving corrections regulations promulgated pursuant to notice-and-comment
rulemaking 104 and in cases involving far more informal policies or practices.105
For example, in a Fourth Circuit case applying Turner to uphold a “policy” of
single-celling all gay male prisoners, the corrections “policy” at issue was the
decision of a sergeant who reportedly said, “as long as I please my supervisor,
what I say goes and whether or not it’s right, it’s non-grievable.” 106
One area, however, in which the Court has declined to apply Turner
101. 482 U.S. at 91-93.
102. Id. at 84-85.
103. See, e.g., Banks v. Beard, 548 U.S. 521 (2006) (upholding restriction on newspapers and
magazines); Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126 (2003) (upholding restrictions on visitation); Shaw
v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223 (2001) (upholding prohibition on inmate-to-inmate correspondence in
which one prisoner gives legal advice to another); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990)
(upholding policy regarding procedure for forcible medication of inmates); Thornburgh v. Abbott,
490 U.S. 401 (1989) (upholding restrictions on certain publications); O’Lone v. Shabazz, 482 U.S.
342 (1987) (upholding prison work detail regulations that resulted in Muslim inmates missing
Jumu’ah services). In Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 361-63 (1996), a case involving the standard
for access to courts claims, the majority emphasized that the remedial order entered by the district
court was inconsistent with the “deferential standard” of Turner. See also Robertson, The
Rehnquist Court, supra note 90, at 107-08 (discussing cases in which the Supreme Court had
applied Turner up to that time). Lower courts also apply Turner deferentially. See Weidman,
supra note 77, at 1521 (“Lower courts’ internalization and extension of the Supreme Court’s
mandates mark the complete transformation of the hands-off tradition into a full-blown culture of
judicial deference.”).
104. Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 129 (2003) (upholding restrictions on visitation
imposed by Michigan Administrative Code, MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 791.6609 (1980)).
105. See Von Minden v. Jankowski, 268 Fed. App’x 352 (5th Cir. 2008) (upholding under
Turner a Washington County, Texas, county jail visitation rule prohibiting a father from visiting
his son because the father had been detained pretrial on a marijuana possession charge for one day
within the previous six months); Veney v. Wyche, 293 F.3d 726, 734 (4th Cir. 2002) (applying
Turner to uphold regional jail policy of single-celling all gay male prisoners); Bowman v.
Beasley, 8 Fed. App’x 175, 179 (4th Cir. 2001) (upholding under Turner a South Carolina
Department of Corrections practice of segregating all HIV+ prisoners by moving them to a
particular facility).
106. Brief of Appellant at *7, Veney v. Wyche, 2001 WL 3438545 (4th Cir. Dec. 10, 2001)
(No. 01-6603).
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deference is in examining an express racial categorization. 107 When confronted
with a California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”)
unwritten policy of racially segregating incoming prisoners on a temporary
basis, the Court remanded for the lower court to apply strict scrutiny, the
normal standard of review for race-based classifications. 108 It explained,
“[P]ublic respect for our system of justice is undermined when the system
discriminates based on race.” 109
Prison grievance policies, procedures by which prisoners can complain
about problems to prison administrators, are accorded even greater deference
than other rules. The PLRA requires that prisoners “exhaust” all available
remedies before bringing federal claims to court. 110 In a pair of decisions
involving the PLRA exhaustion requirement, the Court has accorded prison and
jail grievance policies great weight in determining which prisoners’ claims will
be heard. In Woodford v. Ngo, 111 the Supreme Court considered the effect of
procedural error on the PLRA requirement that prisoners exhaust all available
administrative remedies before filing a lawsuit. 112 It concluded that the PLRA
requires “proper exhaustion.” 113
This requirement has significant
consequences: Prisoners who miss a filing deadline or otherwise fail to comply
with a procedural requirement in the prison grievance process might be forever
barred from bringing their claim to court. 114
In reaching its conclusion, the Court examined analogous concepts in
administrative law and concluded that the PLRA “uses the term ‘exhausted’ to
mean what the term means in administrative law.” 115 The Woodford Court
emphasized the purposes of administrative exhaustion: “Proper exhaustion
demands compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural
rules because no adjudicative system can function effectively without imposing
107. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005) (concluding that strict scrutiny should be
applied to examine an unwritten California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation policy
segregating incoming inmates by race).
108. Id. at 509-10.
109. Id. at 511. Perhaps the express racial categorization in Johnson came too close to
making manifest the racial hierarchies perpetuated in the criminal justice system, in a way that
facially neutral prison regulations do not. Cf. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976)
(disparate impact based on facially neutral policies was insufficient to demonstrate an equal
protection violation).
110. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2009) (“No action shall be brought with respect to prison
conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any
jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are
exhausted.”).
111. 548 U.S. 81 (2006).
112. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2009).
113. 548 U.S. at 93.
114. Kermit Roosevelt, Exhaustion Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act: The
Consequence of Procedural Error, 52 EMORY L.J. 1771, 1810-13 (2003); Margo Schlanger &
Giovanna Shay, Preserving the Rule of Law in America’s Jails & Prisons: The Case for Amending
the PLRA, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 139 (2009).
115. 548 U.S. at 93.
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some orderly structure on the course of its proceedings.” 116 Thus, Woodford
ostensibly treated prison grievance policies like other agencies’ procedural
rules even though prison policies often determine prisoners’ ability to seek
redress for constitutional violations. 117
However, in his concurrence in Woodford, Justice Breyer, an
administrative law scholar, suggested that “administrative law . . . contains well
established exceptions to exhaustion,” and these might apply in the PLRA
context as well. 118 Although there is some tension between Justice Breyer’s
suggestion and other Supreme Court PLRA exhaustion precedent, 119 his
concurrence reminds us that if administrative law principles are going to be
applied in the prison context, they should not be imported selectively.
In a follow-on case the next year, Jones v. Bock, the Supreme Court
emphasized that “it is the prison’s requirements, and not the PLRA, that define
the boundaries of proper exhaustion.” 120 Nonetheless, Chief Justice Roberts
included language seemingly refuting the notion that the Court was returning to
a “hands-off” posture. “Our legal system,” he wrote, “remains committed to
guaranteeing that prisoner claims of illegal conduct by their custodians are
fairly handled according to law.” 121
In short, while asserting that courts remain open to prisoners’
constitutional claims, the Supreme Court has accorded corrections officials
significant leeway, even when constitutional rights are implicated. 122 Even
while deferring to corrections rules, most Supreme Court case law does not
differentiate among types of prison and jail regulations and policies. In fact,
116.
117.

Id. at 90-91.
See 2 KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE, § 15.5, at 331 (4th ed. 2002) (describing the “constitutional right exception” to the
exhaustion doctrine in non-PLRA administrative law contexts).
118. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 103-04 (2006) (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting
exceptions to administrative exhaustion requirements for constitutional claims: futility, hardship,
and inadequate or unavailable administrative remedies).
119. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002) (exhaustion required for “all inmate suits
about prison life”); Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001) (PLRA exhaustion required
regardless of “the relief offered through administrative procedures”).
120. 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007).
121. Id. at 203.
122. Another major obstacle to prisoners’ rights suits is the high standard of liability for
Eighth Amendment violations—the “deliberate indifference” standard. Farmer v. Brennan, 511
U.S. 825, 837 (1994) (“[A] prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for
denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and disregards
an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.”). Prison policies are a focus of litigation in the
Eighth Amendment context as well, particularly in the area of supervisory liability. See
Richardson v. Goord, 347 F.3d 431 (2d Cir. 2003) ( holding that, in the Second Circuit,
supervisory liability may be demonstrated by: “(1) actual direct participation in the constitutional
violation, (2) failure to remedy a wrong after being informed through a report or appeal, (3)
creation of a policy or custom that sanctioned conduct amounting to a constitutional violation, or
allowing such a policy or custom to continue, (4) grossly negligent supervision of subordinates
who committed a violation, or (5) failure to act on information indicating that unconstitutional acts
were occurring”).
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corrections rules originate from a wide range of administrative and legal
processes representing varying degrees of transparency and accountability. The
next section describes how corrections regulations are often exempt from
normal rulemaking procedures.
II. REGULATING CORRECTIONS
This Section surveys state administrative procedure act provisions
regarding corrections policies 123 and then discusses some of the practical
implications of corrections policies for prisoners, their families, and free
communities.
A. Survey of Administrative Procedure Acts
State prisoners are the focus of this Article because they are by far the
most numerous, 124 but it is useful to examine the regulation of federal prisons
as a point of comparison. The U.S. Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) is subject to the
rulemaking requirements of the federal Administrative Procedure Act
(“APA”). 125 “Informal” notice-and-comment rulemaking under the federal
123. Private prisons may be subject to department of corrections regulations through contract
provisions, Nichols v. TransCor America, No. M2001-01889-COA-R9-CV, 2002 WL 1364059, at
*8 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002) (noting provisions of contract between State of Florida and TransCor
stating that inmates who are transported by contractor shall be treated in accordance with the
Department of Correction’s rules and regulations), but in other jurisdictions, they are not subject
to state corrections regulations, Moore v. Gaither, 767 A.2d 278, 286-87 (D.C. 2001) (private
Correctional Treatment Facility not subject to Lorton Regulations Approval Act governing
District of Columbia prisons). Although regulation of private prisons is beyond the scope of this
Article, commentators have urged additional administrative law and regulatory controls. See
Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Globalization, Democracy, and the Need for a New Administrative Law, 10
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 125, 126, 130-31 (2003) [hereinafter “Aman, Globalization”]
(arguing that prison privatization creates a “democracy deficit” that can be bridged in part through
extension of administrative law “values” to new “public/private arrangements”); Alfred C. Aman,
Jr., Privatization, Prisons, Democracy, and Human Rights: The Need to Extend the Province of
Administrative Law, 12 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 511, 516 (arguing that “delegations of
public functions to private bodies,” such as private prisons, “is a crucial area for administrative
law reform and an important way of guarding against human rights violations”); Jack Beermann,
The Reach of Administrative Law in the United States, in THE PROVINCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW 171, 191-93 (Michael Taggart ed., 1997) (arguing that private prisons companies should be
considered “state actors” subject to administrative law strictures); Sharon Dolovich, State
Punishment and Private Prisons, 55 DUKE L.J. 439, 515 (2005) (“There ought to be benchmark
standards of quality and humanity that apply to all prisons, set by state departments of corrections
themselves—or if this arrangement would create too great a conflict of interest, then by an
independent body.”).
124. The Bureau of Justice Statistics reported that at year-end 2007, 1.4 million people were
incarcerated in state prisons (not including jails), while only 201,142 prisoners were in federal
jurisdiction. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CORRECTIONS STATISTICS, http://www.ojp.usdoj.g
ov/bjs/correct.htm#findings (last visited Oct. 30, 2009).
125. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006). An amicus brief filed in a 2001 U.S. Supreme Court case
involving a BOP regulation explained, “Certain BOP actions relating to determinations for
individual prisoners are exempt from the APA’s requirements, but the exemption does not extend
to the BOP’s rule-making activities.” Amicus Curiae Brief of the National Association of
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APA essentially requires that the agency provide notice of the proposed rule,
provide interested parties with an opportunity for comment, and explain the
reasons behind the choices it made in the final version. 126 A federal court
reviewing BOP regulations under the APA can strike down prison rules if they
are “arbitrary and capricious,” or remand for a further statement of reasoning if
the prison authority failed to provide an adequate rationale. 127
Like other federal agencies, however, the BOP need not comply with
APA rulemaking procedures when it issues “interpretive rules, general
statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or
practice.” 128 These take the form of Program Statements and Institutional
Supplements. 129 However, under the federal APA, “interpretive” rules and
statements of policy are not meant to bind parties or affect substantive rights. 130
Criminal Defense Lawyers, Families Against Mandatory Minimums Foundation, and the
Association of Federal Defenders in Support of Petitioner Christopher A. Lopez at 20, Lopez v.
Davis, 531 U.S. 230 (2001) (No. 99-7504), 2000 WL 890320 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3625 (2008) as
“removing applicability of certain sections of the APA, but not Section 553, which establishes
rule-making requirements”). 18 U.S.C. § 3625 states that “[t]he provisions of sections 554 and
555 [adjudication and ancillary proceedings] and 701 through 706 of title 5, United States Code,
do not apply to the making of any determination, decision, or order under this subchapter.” Cf.
Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 244 n.6 (2001) (addressing whether BOP possessed discretion to
promulgate regulation barring felons convicted of using a firearm from early release, although
declining to address the question of whether BOP had complied with APA). A 1977 decision of
the 9th Circuit, Clardy v. Levi, 545 F.2d 1241 (9th Cir. 1977), held that BOP disciplinary hearings
were not subject to the APA, creating a circuit split on whether the BOP was bound by the APA.
See also White v. Henman, 977 F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1992). More recent case law accepts that BOP
rule-making, at least, as distinct from individual adjudication, is subject to the APA. See Todd
Bussert, Peter Goldberger & Mary Price, New Time Limits on Federal Halfway Houses, 21 A.B.A.
SEC. CRIM. JUST. 2 (Spring 2006) (describing litigation about whether the BOP had complied with
the APA in changing rules regarding halfway house placement).
126. Steven Crowley, Making Rules: An Introduction, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1511, 1512-13
(1995) (describing informal rulemaking and contrasting it with “formal” rulemaking under the
federal APA, which is required only in limited circumstances, and which includes a hearing and
the taking of testimony). Compare Arrington v. Daniels, 516 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2008)
(concluding that BOP regulation regarding early release of prisoners who complete residential
substance abuse program violated APA), with Gatewood v. Outlaw, 560 F.3d 843 (8th Cir. 2009)
(concluding that BOP rule passed muster under the APA). See also Grier v. Hood, 46 Fed. App’x
433, 440 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[I]t is apparent that the procedures utilized to adopt the [BOP]
regulation did not comply with the APA.”).
127. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (2006); 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 117, § 7.8, at 496-97. See
also Gatewood, 560 F.3d at 846-48; Alnoubani v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 306 Fed. App’x 309
(7th Cir. 2009) (Under the APA, agency action can be reviewed to determine if it is arbitrary or
capricious or if the agency fails to state a rationale.); Arrington, 516 F.3d at 1111-12.
128. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (2006). The federal APA also has substantive exemptions for
rules pertaining to “military or foreign affairs,” for matters “relating to agency management or
personnel or to public property, loans, grants, benefits or contracts,” and for “good cause,” 5
U.S.C. §§ 553(a)(1)-(2), (b)(B), (d)(3) (2006), although these exceptions have been criticized. See
1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 117, § 7.10, at 503-06.
129. See Federal Bureau of Prisons, Policy and Forms, http://www.bop.gov/policy/index.jsp
(last visited Oct. 30, 2009). See also Complaint, Benkahla v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, (S.D. Ind.
June 18, 2009) (No. 2:09-cv-00025).
130. See 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 117, §§ 6.3-6.4 at 316-49; Robert A. Anthony,
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Thus, whether a BOP regulation is “interpretive or substantive”—whether it is
an internal guideline clarifying a regulation or a true regulation—is a question
often litigated by federal prisoners. 131
State administrative law regimes vary. 132
In some seventeen
jurisdictions—including, inter alia, New York, Illinois, Michigan, and
Wisconsin—the Department of Corrections (“DOC”) is bound by the
provisions of the state administrative procedure act, including notice-andcomment rulemaking procedures, 133 for at least the most formal tier of rules

Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals, and the Like—Should Federal
Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE L.J. 1311, 1315 (1992) (arguing that policy
statements and interpretive rules should not be used to bind the public if they are not submitted to
notice-and-comment rulemaking).
131. A federal prisoner confined in a highly restrictive “Communication Management Unit”
(CMU) reserved for suspected terrorists recently filed suit alleging that the BOP promulgated
substantive rules regarding placement in the CMUs through “Institutional Supplements,” thereby
circumventing the notice-and-comment requirements of the APA. Complaint, Benkahla v. Fed.
Bureau of Prisons, (S.D. Ind. June 18, 2009) (No. 2:09-cv-00025). See also Ojeda v. Fed. Bureau
of Prisons, 225 Fed. App’x 285, 286 (5th Cir. 2007) (Change in the rule of an agency was
discretionary and exempt from notice-and-comment requirements of the APA.); Morrison v.
Woodring, 191 Fed. App’x 606 (9th Cir. 2006) (Security classifications are not subject to APA
rulemaking procedures); Williams v. Van Buren, 117 Fed. App’x 985, 987 (5th Cir. 2004)
(Compassionate release rule “is an interpretive rule that is not subject to the ‘notice and comment’
requirements of the APA”); Sample v. Watts, 100 Fed. App’x 317 (5th Cir. 2004) (Because
program statement “did not contradict or alter an existing rule of longstanding policy or practice, .
. . the Administrative Procedures Act’s notice and comment requirements do not apply.”); Hill v.
Pugh, 75 Fed. App’x 715 (10th Cir. 2003) (“Bureau of Prisons’ program statements . . . are
‘internal agency guidelines’ that are not ‘subject to the rigors of the [APA], including public
notice and comment.’”); Gunderson v. Hood, 268 F.3d 1149 (9th Cir. 2001) (Because the BOP
statement “did no more than ‘clarify or explain existing law,’ it was interpretive and thus not
subject to the rigors of the APA.”). See generally Yana Dobkin, Cabining the Discretion of the
Federal Bureau of Prisons and the Federal Courts: Interpretive Rules, Statutory Interpretation,
and the Debate Over Community Confinement Centers, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 171, 188-98, 213
(2005) (describing litigation about whether changes to BOP halfway house placement rules were
interpretive or substantive; noting that BOP rule-change in the form of a “[m]emorandum” was
really a substantive rule that “offer[ed] no meaningful opportunity for input”).
132. Each state’s administrative procedure act rulemaking provisions regarding corrections, if
any, are set out in a chart in the Appendix. This Article focuses on rulemaking procedures under
state administrative procedure acts. There are also issues regarding whether certain hearings in
prison settings are “contested cases” for which judicial review is available. See, e.g., Clinton v.
Bonds, 816 S.W.2d 169 (Ark. 1991) (Inmates have a right to judicial review of constitutional
questions, even if the state Administrative Procedure Act exempts prison disciplinary procedures
from the definition of “contested cases.”); Walen v. Dep’t of Corr., 505 N.W.2d 519 (Mich. 1993)
(concluding that prison disciplinary hearings fall within definition of “contested case” for the
purpose of FOIA, although such proceedings are exempted from some provisions of the state
Administrative Procedure Act); Al-Shabazz v. State, 527 S.E.2d 742 (S.C. 2000). These questions
are beyond the scope of this article.
133. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 44.280.030, 33.30.021 (2008); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-931603(d)(2) (Supp. 2009); ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 2, § 850.120(c)-(d) (2002); IND. CODE ANN. §
11-8-2-5(b)(1) (West 2004); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 197.020, 196.035 (LexisNexis 1999); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-A, § 1402 (1988); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 30A, § 1A (West 2001);
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 84-901 to -920 (2008); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 10A:1-1.5(a) (2009); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 64-13-10(2) (2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 831(a) (2003). See also Abdullah v.
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deemed “regulations.” Twenty-eight U.S. jurisdictions expressly exempt some
rules affecting prisoners from the state administrative procedure act in whole or
in part, 134 and about a half-dozen more have interpreted general exemptions to
their state administrative procedure act to apply to some rules affecting
prisoners. 135 Connecticut has done some of both. 136
These types of exemptions follow from revisions of the Model State
Administrative Procedure Act.
For instance, the 1961 Model State
Administrative Procedure Act included an exemption to rulemaking procedures
for regulations pertaining only to internal management of the agency, which
was adopted by many jurisdictions. 137 The 1981 revision to the Model State
Administrative Procedure Act not only included an exemption for “procedural
requirements rules concerning only internal management that do not
substantially affect procedural or substantive rights of any segment of the
Gunter, 497 N.W.2d 12, 860 (Neb. 1993); Jones v. Smith, 478 N.E.2d 191, 192-193 (N.Y. 1985);
Weaver v. Dep’t of Corr., 720 A.2d 178 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1998); Parker v. Gorczyk, 787 A.2d
494 (Vt. 2001); State ex rel. Clifton v. Young, 394 N.W.2d 769, 772-73 (Wis. Ct. App. 1986);
Mich. Dep’t of Corr., Policy Directive 01.04.110 (July 01, 2007), available at http://www.michiga
n.gov/documents/corrections/01_04_110_199868_7.pdf; N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 10A:1-1.5(a)
(2009); Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. and Corr., Notice Procedure, 5120: 2-1-01 (July 01, 2002)
(referencing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 119.03 (LexisNexis 2007)), available at http://www.drc.ohi
o.gov/web/administrative_rules/documents/2-1-01.pdf; Oregon Dep’t of Corr., Rule No. 291-0010020 (July 20, 2007), available at http://arcweb.sos.state.or.us/rules/OARS_200/OAR_291/291_0
01.html.
134. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 41-22-3(9)(g)(1) (LexisNexis 2000); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §
41-1005(A)(7) (2004); CAL. PENAL CODE § 5058(c) (West 2008); COLO. REV. STAT. § 17-1-111
(2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 18-78a (West 2006); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4322(d)
(2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 50-13-2(1) (2009); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 20-212 (1997); IOWA ADMIN.
CODE r. 201-10.2(17A) (2009); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-415(f) (1997); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 30A, § 1A (West 2001); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 14.03(b)(1) (West 2005); MISS. CODE ANN. §
25-43-1.102(i)(ii)(6) (West 2006); MO. ANN. STAT. § 536.010(6)(k) (West 2008); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 2-4-102(2)(a)(ii) (2009); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 233B.039(1)(b) (LexisNexis 2007);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21-H:8 (LexisNexis 2008); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-4-2 (LexisNexis
2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-1(d)(6) (2007); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-01(11)(f) (1991);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 250.4(A)(10) (West Supp. 2009); S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-10 (2005);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 1-26-1(8)(g) (2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-5-102(10)(G) (2005); TEX.
GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2001.226 (Vernon 2008); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-4002(B)(9)-(10) (2008);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 34.05.030(c) (West 2003); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29A-1-3(c)
(LexisNexis 2007); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 25-1-105(a) (2009).
135. See Pierce v. Lantz, 965 A.2d 576, 579-81 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009); Caldwell v. State, 821
So.2d 374 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002); Tai v. Chung, 570 P.2d 563 (Haw. 1977); Peterson v.
Michael, 960 So.2d 1260 (La. Ct. App. 2007); Massey v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Pub. Safety and Corr.
Servs., 886 A.2d 585, 601 (Md. 2005); Johnson v. State, No. 99-1007, 2002 WL 1803931 (R.I.
Super. Ct. 2002).
136. Connecticut expressly exempts certain regulations from notice-and-comment
rulemaking, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 18-78a (West 2006), and a recent Connecticut decision
has interpreted Connecticut law to exempt other rules, see Pierce v. Lantz, 965 A.2d 576, 579-81
(Conn. App. Ct. 2009) (concluding that DOC regulations regarding censorship of “sexually
explicit materials and compact discs with parental advisory stickers” and price mark-up on items
in prison commissary were not “rules” within the meaning of section 4-166 (13) of the
Connecticut Statute).
137. Massey, 886 A.2d at 598.
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public,” but also expressly excluded from rulemaking requirements rules
“concerning only inmates of a correctional or detention facility.” 138
Among jurisdictions with a general state administrative procedure act
exemption for rules regarding “internal management” of an agency, courts have
differed in their interpretation of the provision. Courts in Connecticut, Rhode
Island, and Tennessee have read such exemptions to exclude at least some
prison regulations from notice-and-comment requirements. 139 The New York
Court of Appeals took a different approach, writing in Jones v. Smith that
prisoners are, in fact, the members of the “general public” affected by the
department action. 140 The Michigan Supreme Court has agreed with the New
York court, rejecting the argument that rules governing prisoners did not affect
the general public. The Michigan Court wrote that “this belief seems to
overlook the obvious public concern of humanitarian and civil rights groups
[and] completely overlooks the concern of the Legislature.” 141
Maryland’s highest court has twice interpreted an exemption for rules
concerning only “internal management” that do not “affect directly the rights of
the public or the procedures available to the public.” 142 In both cases, the
Maryland Court of Appeals concluded that the exemption did not apply to
certain corrections regulations. In 2005, in Massey v. Secretary, Department of
Public Safety and Correctional Services, the court concluded that this
exemption did not apply to prison disciplinary regulations, which affect
“fundamental rights.” 143 Nonetheless, Massey stated that many other prison
rules were not subject to rule-making requirements. “[T]he myriad of rules
governing the details of prison life—what inmates may wear, what they may or
may not keep in their cells or on their persons, the rules governing security,
sanitation, hygiene, phone calls, mail, and visits,” the court wrote—need not be

138. Id. at 599. See also ARTHUR E. BONFIELD, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE RULE MAKING §
3.3.5, at 94-95 (1986) (discussing section 3-116 of 1981 Model State Administrative Procedure
Act). As this article was being written, the State Administrative Procedure Act Study Committee
of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws was discussing a revised
Model State Administrative Procedure Act. Its definition of “Rule” exempts internal policies in a
number of ways but contains no specific exemption for rules affecting prisoners. As of May 18,
2009, section 102(27) of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
Model State Administrative Procedure Act discussion draft provides that the term “Rule” does not
include, inter alia, “(A) statements concerning only the internal management of an agency and not
affecting private rights or procedures available to the public.” Revised Model State Admin.
Procedure Act § 102(27) (Proposed Draft 2009), http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/msap
a/2009mar_clean.htm.
139. See, e.g., Pierce v. Lantz, 965 A.2d 576, 579-81 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009); Johnson v. State,
No. 99-1007, 2002 WL 1803931 (R.I. Super. Ct. 2002); Abdur’rahma v. Bredsen, 181 S.W.3d 292
(Tenn. 2005).
140. Jones v. Smith, 478 N.E.2d 191, 192-93 (N.Y. 1985).
141. Martin v. Dep’t of Corr., 384 N.W.2d 392, 396 (Mich. 1986).
142. MD. CODE ANN., CORR. SERVS. § 2-109(c)(2) (LexisNexis 2008). MD. CODE ANN.,
STATE GOV’T § 10-101(g)(2)(i)(2) (LexisNexis 2004).
143. Massey v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Pub. Safety and Corr. Servs., 886 A.2d 585, 598 (Md. 2005).
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adopted as regulations. 144 Two years later, in Evans v. State, the court
concluded that the exemption did not apply to lethal injection protocols, which
affect not only the condemned but also correctional personnel and witnesses to
the execution. 145
In its opinion interpreting the “internal management” exception, the
Maryland Court of Appeals wrote that “there has been surprisingly little
comment on the general meaning and scope of that exemption.” 146 It relied
heavily on the few authorities to address the question, particularly state
administrative law expert Arthur Bonfield, who commented that “agencies
could too easily subvert public rulemaking requirements if they could avoid
those procedures for anything they called an internal directive to staff.” 147
Bonfield characterized such exceptions as “very narrowly drawn” and meant
“to assure that matters of internal agency management that are purely of
concern to the agency and its staff are effectively excluded from normal rulemaking . . . requirements.” 148 The policies that fell within this exemption, he
wrote, were those that “face inwards.” 149
Litigation challenging lethal injection protocols in other states, including
California, also has turned on the interpretation of specific state administrative
procedure act exemptions. Like the Maryland case, the California litigation
focused on whether lethal injection protocols were exempt as “internal”
management regulations, or whether they had an effect “beyond [the prison’s]
walls” and thus were subject to the state Administrative Procedure Act. 150 The
First District of the California Courts of Appeal concluded that the lethal
injection protocol was subject to the state Administrative Procedure Act.151
Courts in other states have reached different conclusions, reasoning that lethal
injection protocols concern only inmates of a correctional facility, and thus fall
within exceptions for rules regarding “internal management.” 152
144. Id. at 602.
145. Evans v. State, 914 A.2d 25, 80 (Md. 2007).
146. Massey, 886 A.2d at 598.
147. Id. at 599 (quoting Arthur Bonfield, The Iowa Administrative Procedure Act:
Background, Construction, Applicability, Public Access to Agency Law, the Rulemaking Process,
60 IOWA L. REV. 61, 79 (1975)) (emphasis omitted).
148. Id. (quoting BONFIELD, supra note 138, § 6.17.02, at 402) (emphasis omitted).
149. Id. (quoting Bonfield, supra note 147, at 834).
150. Morales v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 724, 732 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
151. Id. See also Bowling et al. v. Kentucky Dept. of Corr., 2007-SC-000021-MR (Nov. 25,
2009) (concluding that a lethal injection protocol was subject to Kentucky Administrative
Procedure Act).
152. See, e.g., Middleton v. Mo. Dep’t of Corr., 278 S.W.3d 193 (Mo. 2009) (concluding that
lethal injection protocol was not a “rule” within the meaning of the Missouri Administrative
Procedure Act because it fell within exemption for “a statement concerning only inmates of an
institution under the control of the department of corrections”); Abdur’rahma v. Bredesen, 181
S.W.3d 292 (Tenn. 2005) (Lethal injection protocol is not a “rule” under the UAPA because the
UAPA does not include “internal management of state government” or “statements concerning
inmates of a correctional facility.”); Porter v. Commonwealth, 661 S.E.2d 415, 432-33 (Va. 2008)
(Virginia execution procedures were not subject to the state Administrative Procedure Act because
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Even if a state administrative procedure act ostensibly requires a
corrections authority to make regulations pursuant to notice-and-comment
rulemaking, there are still many corrections rules and policies promulgated
outside of administrative law strictures that affect prisoners’ substantive rights,
as well as broader communities. 153 California permits “local” rules affecting
only a single institution to be promulgated outside of notice-and-comment
procedures. 154 Feeley and Swearingen have noted that California may overuse
its “local rules” process, 155 producing negative consequences. For example,
confusion can result when a prisoner is transferred and medical or psychiatric
care practices vary between facilities. 156
Other jurisdictions with multiple tiers of rule-making also use informal
processes heavily. While the Michigan Department of Corrections (“MDOC”)
must promulgate administrative regulations pursuant to its state administrative
procedure act, 157 its policy directives are promulgated more informally (and
there are about 189 policy directives on the MDOC web site). Ohio also has
two tiers of regulations—administrative regulations promulgated pursuant to
the state administrative code 158 and policy directives approved by the
Commissioner. 159 The policy directives cover a wide range of critical areas,
including medical and mental health care, inmate discipline, responding to
inmate sexual assaults, religious practice, visitation, and mail. 160 In Alaska as
well, regulations are promulgated pursuant to the procedures of the Alaska
Administrative Procedure Act, 161 but the Commissioner is also authorized to
it exempts “actions of agencies” relating to “inmates or prisoners.”). See also Ark. Dep’t of Corr.
v. Williams, No. 08-1031 (Ark. Oct. 29, 2009) (noting that the Arkansas legislature amended
section 5-4-617 of the Arkansas Code to exempt lethal injection protocols from the state
Administrative Procedure Act); Jackson v. Danberg, C.A. No. 07M-09-141 RRC, 2008 WL
1850585 (Del. Super. Ct. 2008) (lethal injection protocol exempt from Administrative Procedure
Act).
153. See Anthony, supra note 130, at 1315 (arguing that “[e]xcept to the extent that they
interpret specific statutory or regulatory language . . . nonlegislative rules like policy statements,
guidances, manuals and memoranda should not be used to bind the public,” because they are not
subject to notice-and-comment rulemaking) (emphasis omitted).
154. Malcolm M. Feeley & Van Swearingen, Reducing Litigation Exposure: An Evaluation
of How the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation Responds to Court Orders
and Anticipates Future Legal Issues 31-35 (June 25, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 34.
157. See Mich. Dep’t of Corr., Policy Directive 01.04.110 (July 01, 2007), available at
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/corrections/01_04_110_199868_7.pdf.
158. See Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. and Corr., Notice Procedure, 5120: 2-1-01 (July 01, 2002)
(referencing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 119.03 (LexisNexis 2007)), available at
http://www.drc.ohio.gov/web/administrative_rules/documents/2-1-01.pdf.
159. See Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. and Corr., Department Directives, No. 01-COM-01 (Jan. 26,
2008), available at http://www.drc.ohio.gov/web/drc_policies/documents/01-COM-01.pdf.
160. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. and Corr., Policies, http://www.drc.ohio.gov/web/drc_policies/drc
_policies.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2009).
161. ALASKA STAT. § 44.28.030 (2008) (“The commissioner may adopt regulations to carry
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promulgate a policy manual, 162 which deals with issues including relations
between the corrections department and tribal governments. 163
Another important area of corrections policy-making, both beyond the
scope of extended discussion in this Article and not typically subject to state
administrative procedure act rulemaking strictures, is policy-making in local
jails. The Urban Institute reports that “over nine million people pass through
America’s local jails each year.” 164 Many of these facilities are run by cities,
counties, and local sheriffs.
In some jurisdictions, state corrections
departments promulgate administrative regulations setting standards for local
jails (particularly those holding state inmates). 165 In other jurisdictions, jail
policies are promulgated far more informally. 166 Although this Article does not
capture this area of informal policy-making, it warrants further consideration.
While this Article focuses on state administrative rule-making provisions,
the availability of judicial review of corrections rules, policies, and actions
under state administrative procedure acts is also consequential, if for no other
reason than to ensure that the rulemaking process is legitimate. 167 A
comprehensive discussion of state administrative procedure act provisions for
judicial review of corrections policies is beyond the scope of this Article; this is
a potential area for future research. 168
out or assist in carrying out the powers and duties of the department.”); §§ 44.62.010-.630
(describing notice-and-comment rulemaking process); § 44.62.640 (a)(3) (defines “regulation”).
162. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, § 05.155(a) (2004) (“The department will maintain a
manual comprised of policies and procedures established by the commissioner to interpret and
implement relevant sections of the Alaska Statutes and 22 AAC.”). See Mathis v. Sauser, 942
P.2d 1117, 1123 nn.12-13 (Alaska 1997) (concluding that policy manual need not be promulgated
pursuant to state Administrative Procedure Act).
163. Alaska Dep’t of Corr., Tribal Government-to-Government Relations, Index No. 107.01,
(Apr. 22, 2002) (“This policy is to provide guidance to all departmental employees involved in
any action that will significantly or uniquely affect federally recognized tribal governments in
Alaska.”).
164. The Urban Institute, The Transition from Jail to Community (TJC) Initiative (2009),
http://www.urbaninstitute.org/projects/tjc/index.cfm.
165. See IND. CODE ANN. § 11-12-4-1(a) (West 2004) (“The department shall adopt under
[the state Administrative Procedure Act] minimum standards for county jails . . . .”); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 441.055 (LexisNexis 1999) (requiring the Department of Corrections to promulgate
regulations pursuant to the state Administrative Procedure Act establishing minimum standards
for jails for those counties that house state prisoners); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 31-20-9(a)(2)
(LexisNexis 2003). New York City also has a Board of Correction that sets minimum standards
for the City’s jails, pursuant to the City’s Administrative Procedure Act. See Martin F. Horn, Jail
Rules Must Be Updated, N.Y. L.J., June 12, 2007, at 2; Michael B. Mushlin, John Horan, David
Lenefsky, Madeline deLone, John M. Brickman, & Clay Hiles, Independent Oversight of N.Y.
Jails, N.Y. L.J., May 17, 2007, at 2.
166. See, e.g., Byar v. Lee, 336 F. Supp. 2d 896, 906 (W.D. Ark. 2004) (County sheriff
promulgated jail policies based on the Ten Commandments, which the district court concluded
violated the Establishment Clause.).
167. Cf. Feeley & Swearingen, supra note 154, at 37 (describing the value of oversight of
rulemaking).
168. In some states, corrections authorities are excluded entirely from all provisions of the
state administrative procedure act or from the definition of “agency,” thereby exempting their

352

BERKELEY JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW

[Vol. 14:329

B. The Impact on Prisoners, Their Families, and Free Communities
Given the millions of incarcerated people and the hundreds of thousands
of prisoners returning home each year, it is now more important than ever to
subject prison and jail regulations to public scrutiny. This section describes the
breadth and range of such policies, including their effects on prisoners, their
families, and free communities. The purpose is to demonstrate why at least
some corrections policies—perhaps those limiting prisoners’ substantial rights
and those affecting outside communities—should be subject to notice-andcomment rulemaking. 169

actions from all provisions of the state administrative procedure act, including judicial review of
final “agency” action. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 20-212 (1997); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 67-5201(2)
(1995); MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-4-102(2)(a)(ii) (2009); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 233B.039(1)(b)
(LexisNexis 2007); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-01(2)(m) (Supp. 2009); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §
2001.226 (Vernon 2008); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-4002(B)(9)-(10) (2008); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 34.05.030(c) (West 2003); Harrison v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 164 S.W.3d 871, 876
(Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (holding that section 2001.226 of the Texas Administrative Procedure Act
“expressly bars” judicial review of a Department of Criminal Justice disciplinary proceeding).
Other states, like Colorado, Kansas, and Wyoming, expressly exclude corrections policies from
state administrative procedure act provisions for judicial review. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 17-1-111,
24-4-106 (2008); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-603(c)(1)-(3) (1997); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 25-1-105(a)
(2009) (“The promulgation of substantive rules by the department, the conduct of its hearings and
its final decisions are specifically exempt from all provisions of the Wyoming Administrative
Procedure Act including the provisions for judicial review . . . .”). See also Stanhope v. State, 825
P.2d 25, 26 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that a prisoner classification decision is not “subject to
judicial review under the Arizona Administrative Review Act”); Quigley v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr.,
745 So. 2d 1029, 1031 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that under the state Administrative
Procedure Act a prisoner was not entitled to judicial review of DOC statement of reasons for rule
forbidding prisoners to retain notarized documents, and concluding that the prisoner’s “only
avenue for judicial review is to seek declaratory or other relief in circuit court”). State
administrative procedure acts sometimes provide for a form of judicial review or “declaratory
judgment” specific to rulemaking; if corrections policies are exempt from rulemaking, such an
action presumably would not be available. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 41-22-10 (LexisNexis 2000);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1034 (2004); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 11350 (West 2005); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 4-175 (West 2007); GA. CODE ANN. § 50-13-10 (2009); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §
91-7 (LexisNexis 2007); MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T § 10-125 (LexisNexis 2004); MO. ANN.
STAT. § 536.050(1) (West 2008); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 541-A:24 (LexisNexis 2006); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 12-8-8 (LexisNexis 1998); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-4 (2007); N.D. CENT. CODE §
28-32-42(2) (Supp. 2009); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 306 (West 2008); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 4235-7 (2007); S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-150(a) (2005); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 1-26-14 (2004); TEX.
GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2001.040 (Vernon 2008); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-4026 (2008); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 34.05.514 (West 2003). One such form of declaratory judgment was provided in
the 1961 Model State Administrative Procedure Act. BONFIELD, supra note 138, § 9.2.1, at 556.
169. My purpose here is not to evaluate these policies, and certainly not to rate
implementation and compliance in real life. The existence of policies—even regulations subject
to state administrative procedure act requirements—does not guarantee that a corrections system
will be well-run. The Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC), for example, has 189 policy
directives on its web site, but the inadequacies of its health care system are infamous. See, e.g.,
Elizabeth Alexander, Prison Health Care, Political Choice, and the Accidental Death Penalty, 11
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1 (2009) (focusing on Michigan’s DOC).
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1. The effect on prisoners
Prison and jail policies affect almost every area of prisoners’ lives. 170
Classification, 171 disciplinary, 172 and grievance policies 173 all have a
tremendous impact on how prisoners serve their sentence and what recourse
they have to courts and other authorities. Corrections policies govern medical
and mental health care, 174 including prenatal and OB/GYN care, 175 shackling
of women in labor and delivery, 176 and access to abortion. 177 Prison sexual
170. Robertson, The Majority Opinion, supra note 90, at 167 (“Prison rules are wide-ranging
in scope.”). This Article focuses only on written regulations, rules, and policies. Unwritten
custom can be of critical significance in all organizations, but perhaps especially in corrections,
where the discretion and judgment of line staff can greatly affect prisoners’ daily lives. Cf. JOHN
J. DIIULIO, JR., GOVERNING PRISONS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF CORRECTIONAL
MANAGEMENT 238 (1987) (“In most prisons, what correctional officers do and how they do it
depends largely on their personalities or temperaments. They must exercise judgment on a wide
range of matters.”).
171. See, e.g., Ala. Dep’t of Corr., Classification of Inmates, Admin. Reg. 400 (Nov. 10,
2004), available at http://www.doc.state.al.us/docs/AdminRegs/AR400.pdf; Colo. Dep’t of Corr.,
Offender Classification, Admin. Reg. 600-01 (Oct. 15, 2009), available at https://exdoc.state.co.us
/userfiles/regulations/pdf/0600_01.pdf; Conn. Dep’t of Corr., Offender Classification, Admin. Dir.
9.2 (July 1, 2006), available at http://www.ct.gov/doc/LIB/doc/PDF/AD/ad0902.pdf; D.C. Dep’t
of Corr., Classification, Program Statement No. 4090.3D (Sept. 9, 2009), available at http://doc.
dc.gov/doc/frames.asp?doc=/doc/lib/doc/program_statements/4000/PS_4090_3D_Classification_9
809.pdf.
172. See, e.g., Ala. Dep’t of Corr., Disciplinary Hearing Procedures for Major Rule
Violations, Admin. Reg. 403 (Jan. 30, 2003), available at http://www.doc.state.al.us/docs/Admin
Regs/AR403.pdf; Conn. Dep’t of Corr., Code of Penal Discipline, Admin. Dir. 9.5 (Jan. 1, 2008),
available at http://www.ct.gov/doc/LIB/doc/PDF/AD/ad0905.pdf; Tenn. Dep’t of Corr., Policies
& Procedures, Uniform Disciplinary Procedures, Index No. 502.01 (Oct. 1, 2007), available at
http://www.state.tn.us/correction/pdf/502-01.pdf.
173. See, e.g., Conn. Dep’t of Corr., Inmate Administrative Remedies, Admin. Dir. 9.6 (Jan.
31, 2009), available at http://www.ct.gov/doc/LIB/doc/PDF/AD/ad0906.pdf; D.C. Dep’t of Corr.,
Inmate Grievance Procedures, Program Statement No. 4030.1F (Jan. 21, 2008), available at
http://doc.dc.gov/doc/frames.asp?doc=/doc/lib/doc/program_statements/4000/ps_4030_1f_inmate
_grievance_procedures_1_21_08.pdf; Tenn. Dep’t of Corr., Policies & Procedures, Inmate
Grievance Procedures, Index No. 501.01 (Sept. 15, 2007), available at http://www.state.tn.us/corr
ection/pdf/501-01.pdf.
174. See, e.g., D.C. Dep’t of Corr., Health Services, Program Statement No. 6000.1D (Feb.
28, 2008), available at http://doc.dc.gov/doc/frames.asp?doc=/doc/lib/doc/program_statements/60
00/PM_6000_1D_Medical_Mgmt_Final_022808.pdf; Tenn. Dep’t of Corr., Policies &
Procedures, Inmate Co-payment for Health Services, Index No. 113.15, at 6 (Feb. 15, 2008),
available at http://www.state.tn.us/correction/pdf/113-15.pdf (providing for a co-pay of three
dollars for medical visits initiated by the inmate, including an initial request for a pregnancy test,
optometry services, and treatment for “self-injurious behavior”).
175. See DIANA KASDAN, ACLU REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM PROJECT, STATE STANDARDS
FOR PREGNANCY-RELATED HEALTH CARE IN PRISON (2008), available at http://72.3.233.244/rep
roductiverights/gen/pregnancycareinprison.html (collecting department of corrections policies
regarding a range of reproductive issues, and comparing them with national standards); Ellen M.
Barry, Bad Medicine: Health Care Inadequacies in Women’s Prisons, 16 CRIM. JUST. 38 (Spring
2001).
176. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, ABUSE OF WOMEN IN CUSTODY: SEXUAL MISCONDUCT
AND SHACKLING OF PREGNANT WOMEN (2006).
177. See, e.g., ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20, § 415.30(j) (2007), available at http://www.ilga.gov/
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violence and custodial sexual abuse, the subjects of extensive advocacy and
litigation, 178 are also targeted by prison policies. 179 In light of the growing
commission/jcar/admincode/020/020004150000300R.html; Roe v. Crawford, 514 F.3d 789 (8th
Cir. 2008) (applying Turner to strike down a Missouri policy that refused to transport women
prisoners for elective abortions); Colo. State Dep’t of Corr., Birth Control, Pregnancy, Child
Placement, and Abortion, Admin. Reg. 700-12 (Nov. 1, 2008), http://exdoc.state.co.us/userfiles/re
gulations/pdf/0700_12.pdf; Mass. Dep’t of Corr., Health Services Division, Special Health Care
Practices, 103 DOC 620.04 (July 1, 2004), http://www.mass.gov/Eeops/docs/doc/policies/620.pdf;
Budnitz, supra note 88, at 1298-99 (describing state corrections departments’ policies on
prisoners’ access to abortion).
See also Ark. Bd. of Corr., Prenatal Care/Pregnant
Inmates/Residents, Admin. Reg. No. 829 (Aug. 1, 2000), http://www.adc.arkansas.gov/adcar_pdf/
AR829.pdf. The Arkansas policy does not use the word “abortion.” It states that the purpose of
the policy is “to ensure that pregnant inmates/residents of the Department of Correction and the
Department of Community Punishment are provided comprehensive health care services
necessary to reach term or to interrupt pregnancy in accordance with applicable statutes, standards
and regulations.” Id.
178. See generally Jeff Seidel, Sexual Assaults on Female Inmates Went Unheeded, DETROIT
FREE PRESS, Jan. 4, 2009 (describing litigation in which the State of Michigan paid more than $50
million in a case alleging rampant systemic sexual abuse of women prisoners by male guards);
Brenda V. Smith, Reforming, Reclaiming or Reframing Womanhood: Reflections on Advocacy for
Women in Custody, 29 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 1 (2007); Brenda V. Smith, Sexual Abuse of
Women in United States Prisons: A Modern Corollary of Slavery, 33 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 571
(2006).
179. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, §§ 3007, 3401.5 (2008), available at
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Regulations/Adult_Operations/docs/Title15-2008.pdf (“Inmate Sexual
Behavior” and “Employee Sexual Misconduct”); Ala. Dep’t of Corr., Inmate Sexual Offenses &
Custodial Sexual Misconduct, AR 454 (May 22, 2008), available at http://www.doc.state.al.us/do
cs/AdminRegs/AR454.pdf; Ariz. Dep’t of Corr., Department Order Manual, Sexual Misconduct
and Sexual Assaults, No. 125.01 (June 2, 2009), available at http://www.adc.state.az.us/Jill_100_
125.aspx#125.01; Conn. Dep’t of Corr., Sexual Assault Prevention Policy, Admin. Dir. 6.12 (Aug.
15, 2009), available at http://www.ct.gov/doc/LIB/doc/PDF/AD/ad0612.pdf; D.C. Dep’t of Corr.,
Elimination of Sexual Abuse, Assault, and Misconduct, Program Statement No. 3350.2E (Feb. 21,
2007), available at http://doc.dc.gov/doc/frames.asp?doc=/doc/lib/doc/program_statements/3000/
PS_3350.2E_PRISON_RAPE_ELIMINATION_2-21-07.pdf; Ky. Dep’t of Corr., Policies &
Procedures, Sexual Abuse/Assault Prevention and Intervention, Policy No. 14.7 (Feb. 3, 2006),
available at http://www.corrections.ky.gov/NR/rdonlyres/EFF984A4-958F-4DA2-96E8-4CD391
BFCD75/107408/1495.pdf; Mass. Dep’t of Corr., Sexually Abusive Behavior Prevention &
Intervention Policy, 103 DOC 519 (Aug. 5, 2007), available at http://www.mass.gov/Eeops/docs/
doc/policies/519.pdf; Mich. Dep’t of Corr., Prohibited Sexual Conduct Involving Prisoners, Policy
No. 03.03.140 (July, 9, 2007), available at http://www.michigan.gov/documents/corrections/03_0
3_140_199869_7.pdf; Minn. Dep’t of Corr., Prison Rape Elimination Act, Policy 202.057 (May 5,
2009), available at http://www.doc.state.mn.us/DocPolicy2/html/DPW_Display_TOC.asp?Opt=2
02.057.htm; Nev. Dep’t of Corr., Sexual Crimes and Sexual Misconduct: Prevention, Reduction
and Investigation, AR 155 (May 8, 2008), available at http://www.doc.nv.gov/ar/pdf/AR155.pdf;
N.H. Dep’t of Corr., Sexual Harassment, Policy and Procedure Directive 2.39 (Feb. 1, 2008),
available at http://www.nh.gov/nhdoc/documents/2-39.pdf; N.M. Corr. Dep’t, Offender
Protection Against Abuse and Sexual Misconduct; Reporting Procedures, CD-150100 (Jan. 28,
2009), available at http://corrections.state.nm.us/policies/current/CD-150100.pdf; Ohio Dep’t of
Rehab. and Corr., Inmate Sexual Assault and Misconduct, No. 79-ISA-01 (July 1, 2005),
http://www.drc.ohio.gov/web/drc_policies/documents/79-ISA-01.pdf; Oklahoma Prison Rape
Elimination Act, OP-030601 (2008), http://www.doc.state.ok.us/Offtech/op030601.pdf; Penn.
Dep’t of Corr., Sexual Harassment of or Sexual Contact with Inmates, Policy No. DC–ADM 008
(July 25, 2008), available at http://www.cor.state.pa.us/standards/lib/standards/DC- ADM_008_
Sexual_Harassment_of_or_Sexual_Contact_with_Inmates.pdf; Wyo. Dep’t of Corr., Protection
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number of female prisoners 180 and litigation on their behalf, 181 some
jurisdictions have adopted non-discrimination policies, 182 or policies regarding
so-called “gender-responsive” programming. 183 Corrections policies even
address the gender categorization of prisoners for the purposes of housing. 184
In short, prison regulations affect issues ranging from a prisoner’s core
definition of self to how she will serve her time and when she will be released.
2. The impact on prisoners’ families
Policies affecting prisoners’ families and children are even more
appropriately formulated through procedures that permit public input. Prison
policies can greatly affect the extent of family contact and can even define who
is considered a part of a prisoner’s “family.”

From Sexual Misconduct Against Offenders, Policy and Procedure No. 3.402 (Jan. 14, 2008),
available at http://doc.state.wy.us/Media.aspx?mediaId=34.
180. JOANNE BELKNAP, THE INVISIBLE WOMAN: GENDER, CRIME & JUSTICE (2000); MEDA
CHESNEY-LIND, THE FEMALE OFFENDER: GIRLS, WOMEN & CRIME (1997); Ryan S. King,
Moving Toward a Gender-Appropriate Response in the Criminal Justice System, 33 NEW ENG. J.
ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 3 (2007); Marsha L. Levick & Francine T. Sherman, When
Individual Differences Demand Equal Treatment: An Equal Rights Approach to the Special Needs
of Girls in the Juvenile Justice System, 18 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 9 (Spring 2003). See also SILJA J.
TALVI, WOMEN BEHIND BARS: THE CRISIS OF WOMEN IN THE U.S. PRISON SYSTEM (2007).
181. Compare Roubideaux v. N.D. Dep’t of Corr. and Rehab., 570 F.3d 966 (8th Cir. 2009)
(concluding no equal protection and no Title IX violation in provision of programming at male
and female facilities), Klinger v. Dep’t of Corr., 107 F.3d 609, 612, 614 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding
no Title IX violation because comparing male and female prisoners is like comparing “apples to
oranges”), and Women Prisoners v. District of Columbia, 93 F.3d 910, 925-26 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(concluding no equal protection violation because male and female prisoners were not “similarly
situated”), with Jeldness v. Pearce, 30 F.3d 1220, 1227-28 (9th Cir. 1994) (Title IX applies to
prisons and requires equality, not just parity), and Glover v. Johnson, 478 F. Supp. 1075 (D. Mich.
1979) (concluding that lack of programming and educational opportunities for female prisoners
violated equal protection).
182. Mass. Dep’t of Corr., Female Offender Services, 103 DOC 425 (July 23, 2008),
http://www.mass.gov/Eeops/docs/doc/policies/425.pdf; Minn. Dep’t of Corr., Parity for Female
Offenders, Policy No. 102.210 (Dec. 4, 2007), available at http://www.doc.state.mn.us/DocPolicy
2/html/DPW_Display_TOC.asp?Opt=102.210.htm; Okla. Dep’t of Corr., Female Offender
Management, OP-090501 (June 17, 2008), http://www.doc.state.ok.us/Offtech/op090501.pdf.
183. See Cassandra Shaylor, Neither Kind Nor Gentle: The Perils of ‘Gender Responsive
Justice,’ in PHIL SCRATON & JUDE MCCULLOCH, THE VIOLENCE OF INCARCERATION 147-48
(2008) (criticizing “gender-responsive” programming as reinforcing gender stereotypes and a
binary notion of gender).
184. D.C. Dep’t of Corr., Gender Classification and Housing, Program Statement No. 4020.3
para. 2(a) (Feb. 20, 2009) (“DOC shall classify an inmate who has male genitals as a male and one
who has female genitals as a female, unless otherwise classified by the Transgender Committee
consistent with this policy.”). See also Sydney Tarzwell, The Gender Lines Are Marked With
Razor Wire: Addressing State Prison Policies and Practices for the Management of Transgender
Prisoners, 38 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 167, 190-206 (2006) (summarizing then-existing state
policies regarding transgender prisoners); Gabriel Arkles, Safety and Solidarity Across Gender
Lines: Rethinking Segregation of Transgender People in Detention, 18 Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rts. L.
Rev. 515, 525-27 (2009); Dean Spade, Keynote Address: Trans Law & Politics on a Neoliberal
Landscape, 18 Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. Rev. 353, 353 (2009).
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With an unprecedented number of prisoners, there is increasing evidence
of the effects of incarceration for prisoners’ families, and particularly their
children. 185 More than two million American children have an incarcerated
parent. 186 The children of the incarcerated bear “material and psychological
burdens”; 187 they are more likely to experience mental health issues and are
vulnerable to foster care placement. 188 Ultimately, they are at heightened risk
of being incarcerated themselves. 189
Not surprisingly, commentators emphasize the importance of maintaining
prisoners’ family ties, through letters, phone calls, and visits.190 Corrections
regulations affect all three modes of communication. Maintaining telephone
contact is especially important because facilities are frequently located far from
major population centers. 191
Yet collect calls from prison are often
prohibitively expensive, in part because of rates determined by contracts
between corrections officials and phone companies. 192 Prison telephone
policies range from an eight-page policy for the Michigan Department of
Corrections to a one-and-a-half-page policy for the State of Wyoming. These
policies also include provisions for monitoring, call lists, and the duration and
frequency of calls. 193

185. See TODD CLEAR, IMPRISONING COMMUNITIES 93-106 (2007); TRAVIS, supra note 1, at
119 (“[P]rison places an indescribable burden on the relationships between [incarcerated] parents
and their children.”); Donald Braman, Families and Incarceration, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT,
supra note 7, at 117 (“[T]he dramatic increase in the use of incarceration over the last two decades
has in many ways missed its mark, injuring the families of prisoners often as much as and
sometimes more than criminal offenders themselves.”). See generally Philip M. Genty, Damage
to Family Relationships as a Collateral Consequence of Parental Incarceration, 30 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 1671 (2003).
186. Dolovich, supra note 13, at 247.
187. Id.
188. Megan Comfort, Punishment Beyond the Legal Offender, 3 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI.
271, 280 (2007).
189. Dolovich, supra note 13, at 247; Nkechi Taifa & Catherine Beane, Integrative Solutions
to Interrelated Issues: A Multidisciplinary Look Behind the Cycle of Incarceration, 3 HARV. L. &
POL’Y REV. 283, 289 (2009) (quoting a study finding that “forty-six percent of jail inmates had a
family member who had been incarcerated”).
190. See Christy A. Visher, Returning Home: Emerging Findings and Policy Lessons About
Prisoner Reentry, 20 FED. SENT’G REP. 93 (Dec. 2007) (“[M]aintaining family connections
through letters, phone calls, and personal visits has been shown to reduce recidivism rates.”).
191. Genty, supra note 185, at 1673 (“[S]ixty-two percent of incarcerated parents in state
prisons and eighty-two percent in federal prison are incarcerated more than one hundred miles
from their homes.”).
192. See Walton v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 863 N.E.2d 1001 (N.Y. 2007)
(Prisoners’ families challenged proposed phone rates before New York’s Public Service
Commission and in a lawsuit); MEDIA JUSTICE FUND, CRIMINAL CHARGES: EXCESSIVE PRISON
PHONE RATES TAKE A TOLL ON INNOCENT FAMILIES; National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers, N.Y. Prisons Make Millions Profiteering on Inmate Phone Calls, 31 CHAMPION 8 (Jan.Feb. 2007) (2009).
193. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., Prisoner Telephone Use, Policy Directive No. 05.03.130 (Jan. 1,
2009), available at http://www.michigan.gov/documents/corrections/05_03_130_295734_7.pdf;
Wyo. Dep’t of Corr., Administrative Regulations, Inmate Telephone Use, Policy No. 2.403
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Corrections policies can also closely regulate family visitation. 194 For
instance, Michigan’s policy regarding the conduct of contact family visits—a
policy directive and not an administrative regulation—imposes specific limits
on physical contact:
During contact visits, physical contact between prisoners and visitors
is prohibited except for one kiss and one embrace between a prisoner
and each of his/her visitors at the beginning and end of each visit and
when a picture is being taken. In addition, a prisoner and his/her
visitor are permitted to have their arms around the shoulders of one
another and may hold hands. A prisoner who is a parent also may
appropriately touch and hold his/her child if under two years old and
bottle feed his/her infant while visiting. 195
Such restrictive regulations can frighten children and inhibit visitation. 196
However, the effects of these prison rules on prisoners’ families extend
beyond direct limitations on visitation. When visiting prison or jail, prisoners’
relatives are exposed repeatedly to correctional policies and norms, which can
affect their behavior and habits. 197 This produces “a form of socialization to
carceral norms,” 198 a kind of “secondary prisonization.” 199 Later, when
prisoners return home, their families are affected by the “psychological impact
of confinement on the offender”; 200 formerly incarcerated parents employ
discipline methods akin to those imposed in a corrections setting. 201
Corrections regulations can even define who is in a prisoner’s “family.”
For example, provisions of the MDOC administrative regulations restrict visits
by minor members of a prisoner’s extended family: Children are forbidden to
visit unless they are an emancipated minor or the child, step-child, grandchild,
sibling, step-sibling, or half-sibling of the prisoner. 202 The policy specifically
forbids visitation by a prisoner’s child if the prisoner’s parental rights have
been terminated. 203 These rules were challenged and ultimately upheld in a

(2009), available at http://doc.state.wy.us/Media.aspx?mediaId=21 .
194. California’s visitation policy comprises eight sections of the California Administrative
Code. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15 §§ 3170-78 (2007). Because visitation policies affect both
prisoners and visitors, they may not be exempt under state administrative procedure act exceptions
for rules regarding only “inmates.” BONFIELD, supra note 138, § 6.17.7, at 414.
195. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., Policy No. 05.03.140(V) (Oct. 1, 2007), available at http://www.
michigan.gov/documents/corrections/05_03_140_210434_7.pdf.
196. Amy Fettig, Women Prisoners: Altering the Cycle of Abuse, 36 A.B.A. SEC. HUM. RTS.
2, 3 (Spring 2009)
197. Comfort, supra note 188, at 279.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 281.
201. Id.
202. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., Policy No. 05.03.140(J)(4) (Oct. 1, 2007), available at
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/corrections/05_03_140_210434_7.pdf.
203. Id. at Policy No. 05.03.140(J)(4)(1).
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2003 Supreme Court case, Overton v. Bazzetta. 204 The Bazzetta plaintiffs
pointed to the importance of extended family (including cousins, nieces, and
nephews), as well as the benefits of maintaining a parent-child relationship
despite the termination of parental rights. 205 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court
upheld the regulations under Turner, concluding that they were reasonably
related to a legitimate penological interest, and writing that this was “not an
appropriate case” in which to “further elaborat[e]” on constitutional protections
for family ties. 206
Another example of how corrections regulations define “family” is
whether same-sex partners are permitted to participate in overnight “family” or
“conjugal” visits. 207 In 2007, under threat of litigation, and following a noticeand-comment period, California amended its regulation to include registered
domestic partners in the definition of “immediate family,” thus permitting
same-sex partners to participate in overnight visits. 208 The Mississippi DOC,
by contrast, restricts such visits to opposite-sex marriages. 209 Aside from being
challenged through litigation, regulations defining and affecting families should
be subject to input from prisoners’ partners and kin in more jurisdictions.
3. Repercussions in free communities
Policies potentially affecting free communities are most suitable for
notice-and-comment rulemaking. Mass incarceration has tremendous effects
on poor communities of color, 210 as does prisoner reentry. 211 Because some
communities are so enmeshed in the criminal justice system—consider the socalled “Million Dollar Blocks” 212 in which the State spends at least that much
on incarceration annually—these policies can have a real effect on public
204. 539 U.S. 126 (2003) (reviewing challenge to rule 791.6609 of the Michigan
Administrative Code).
205. See Brief of the Respondents, Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126 (2003) (No. 02-94),
2003 WL 469673; Brief of the Public Defender Service for the District of Columbia et al. as
Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126 (2003) (No. 02-94),
2003 WL 469578.
206. 539 U.S. at 131.
207. See Wiggum, supra note 14.
208. Id. at 369 & n.85 (citing CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 3000 (2009)).
209. Id. at 374.
210. CLEAR, supra note 185, at 106-20; TRAVIS, supra note 1, at 120 (“[I]n those
communities where incarceration rates are high, the experience of having a mother or father in
prison is now quite commonplace, with untold consequences for foster care systems,
multigenerational households, social services delivery, community norms, childhood
development, and parenting patterns.”); Michael Pinard, An Integrated Perspective on the
Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions and Reentry Issues Faced by Formerly
Incarcerated Individuals, 86 B.U. L. REV. 623, 628 n.22 (2006) (citing Roberts, supra note 7, at
1276 (“Research in several cities reveals that the exit and reentry of inmates is geographically
concentrated in the poorest, minority neighborhoods.”)).
211. See CADORA, supra note 17; TRAVIS, supra note 1, at xvii (describing prisoner reentry
as “an unprecedented challenge for our society”).
212. GOTTSCHALK, supra note 1, at 20.
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health and the local economy. 213 Alan Elsner has written that “we cannot
separate ourselves from those who are behind bars,” 214 because the “vast
majority of inmates” eventually return to the community. 215 “Society is
profoundly influenced by the abuses they suffer or perpetrate,” he writes. 216
“[T]he skills they pick up—whether legitimate or criminal—the diseases they
contract and the treatment they receive or do not receive” 217 all affect the
communities to which prisoners return.
Policies (or the lack of policies) addressing management of certain
medical issues can have repercussions for broader communities. The return of
large numbers of prisoners with poorly managed chronic conditions and mental
health issues can strain existing community health networks. 218 Jails in large
metropolitan areas like New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago have become the
“nation’s largest mental health facilities.” 219 Whether prisoners receive
appropriate mental health care—or are treated and housed in ways that
exacerbate their illness 220 —has implications for whether they will make a
successful return to the community. Chronic mental health problems that are
not adequately treated “frustrate the process of reintegration for released
prisoners and foster[] recidivism, unemployment, homelessness for the former
prisoner, and economic and emotional strain on his family and community.” 221
Other types of infectious disease—such as drug-resistant TB, Hepatitis C,
and HIV—can spread quickly in prisons that are poorly managed. 222 The
spread of these diseases within institutions can have catastrophic results beyond
the gates:

213. DINA ROSE & TODD CLEAR, INCARCERATION, REENTRY & SOCIAL CAPITAL: SOCIAL
NETWORKS IN THE BALANCE 183 (2002), available at http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/410623
_SocialCapital.pdf (arguing that “concentrated coercive mobility damages neighborhoods because
it diminishes available levels of social capital and collective efficacy”).
214. ELSNER, supra note 77, at 15.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. John V. Jacobi, Prison Health, Public Health: Obligations & Opportunities, 31 AM. J.L.
& MED. 447, 448 (2005).
219. Id. at 452 (quoting Nicholas Freudenberg, Jails, Prisons & the Health of Urban
Populations: A Review of the Impact of the Correctional System on Community Health, 78:2 J.
URBAN HEALTH 214, 220 (2001)).
220. See Jamie Fellner, A Corrections Quandary: Mental Illness and Prison Rules, 41 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 391, 402-405 (2006) (describing how prison disciplinary rules often fail to take
account of the symptoms of mental illness, and how placement in disciplinary segregation can
aggravate mental illness).
221. Jacobi, supra note 218, at 467. See also William J. Rich, The Path of Mentally Ill
Offenders, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 89, 112-13 (2009) (discussing reentry problems for the
mentally ill).
222. Dolovich, supra note 13, at 246 (“Severe overcrowding in often unhygienic conditions,
together with what is frequently an absence of institutional strategies for preventing the spread of
disease, means that prisoners face infection rates for HIV, hepatitis C, tuberculosis, and even staph
that are far in excess of infection rates outside the prison.”).
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Almost all of the two million prisoners now in prisons and jails will
return to their communities one day. If, due to poor prison health care,
they return with uncontrolled syphilis, tuberculosis, HIV, and other
infectious conditions, they will likely infect many around them. In
these circumstances, prisons and jails serve as “epidemiological
pumps,” amplifying infectious conditions, perhaps even transforming
them into treatment-resistant strains, and then sending them out into
society for distribution. It is in the interest of all in society to prevent
the population health effects that demonstrably flow from mistreatment
of the health conditions of prisoners. 223
Department of Corrections policies may cover HIV treatment and
discharge planning, 224 as well as preventing the spread of tuberculosis 225 and
communicable blood-borne infections. 226 DOC policies may also cover other
medical and mental health care. 227 All of these policies should be subject to
input from community and public health organizations.
Release and reentry planning is another suitable area for notice-andcomment. As incarceration rates have skyrocketed, boosting the numbers of
returning prisoners, reentry issues have become more important. 228 These
returning prisoners are concentrated in the poorest communities, compounding

223. Jacobi, supra note 218, at 448. See also TRAVIS, supra note 1, at 188 (arguing that
prison health officials have “an obligation to society as a whole” to develop “policies that reduce
transmission [of communicable diseases] within the communities to which the prisoners return”);
Comfort, supra note 188, at 282; NATIONAL PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION COMMISSION, REPORT
15 (June 2009) (recommending that Congress fund research “into whether consensual and/or nonconsensual sexual activity in the correctional system plays a role in infecting populations outside
of corrections with HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted infections.”).
224. See, e.g., Tenn. Dep’t of Corr., AIDS: Education, Prevention, and Case Management,
Index No. 113.45 (July 1, 2009), available at http://www.state.tn.us/correction/pdf/113-45.pdf
(“Inmates currently on medication regimens shall be provided at least a fourteen (14) day supply,
or their current supply of prescribed medication, whichever is greater.”).
225. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., Policy Nos. 03.04.100, 03.04.115 (Feb. 14, 2005), available at
http://www.michigan.gov/corrections/0,1607,7-119-1441_44369---,00.html (“Health Services”
and “Control of Tuberculosis”); Minn. Dep’t of Corr., Tuberculosis Control for Applicants,
Employees, Contractors, Volunteers & Students, Policy No. 105.180 (May 5, 2009), available at
http://www.doc.state.mn.us/DocPolicy2/html/DPW_Display_TOC.asp?Opt=105.180.htm.
226. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., Control of Communicable Bloodborne Diseases, Policy No.
03.04.120 (July 3, 2000), available at http://www.michigan.gov/documents/corrections/03_04_1
20_180946_7.pdf; Minn. Dep’t of Corr., Bloodborne Pathogen Exposure Control Plan, Policy No.
105.170 (Dec. 4, 2007), available at http://www.doc.state.mn.us/DocPolicy2/html/ DPW_Display
TOC.asp?Opt=105.170.htm.
227. See Tenn. Dep’t of Corr., Access to Health Care, Index No. 113.30 (Feb. 15, 2008),
available at http://www.state.tn.us/correction/pdf/113-30.pdf; Tenn. Dep’t of Corr., Inmate CoPay, Index No. 113.15 (Feb. 15, 2008), available at http://www.state.tn.us/correction/pdf/11315.pdf; Tenn. Dep’t of Corr., Medical Transfer, Index No. 113.04 (Feb. 1, 2009), available at
http://www.state.tn.us/correction/pdf/113-04.pdf; Tenn. Dep’t of Corr., Substance Abuse Services
Delivery, Index No. 113.95 (Mar. 15, 2008), available at http://www.state.tn.us/correction/pdf/11
3-95.pdf.
228. See TRAVIS, supra note 1, at xvii.
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the strain. 229 Again, jurisdictions have a range of policies regarding transition
and release planning, ranging from ambitious plans to provide “a
comprehensive, collaborative, seamless reentry strategy,” 230 to fairly simple
instructions for release procedures (e.g., verify identity, return personal effects,
and issue “gate pay” and “dress-out clothing”). 231
Many of the policies discussed in this section have an impact beyond
prison walls. Some address prisoners’ treatment, affecting many people who
will someday return to free communities. Others affect the families and
children of prisoners while they are incarcerated. Still others have a direct
effect on the nexus between prisons and the free world. Because of the great
impact of such policies, they should be promulgated according to procedures
that promote transparency and public input.
III. THE CASE FOR NOTICE-AND-COMMENT RULEMAKING (OR LESS
DEFERENCE)
A. The Value of Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking.
In light of their significant impact, critical corrections regulations should
be subject to notice-and-comment rulemaking or should be awarded less
deference by courts, at least when they affect prisoners’ substantive rights or
impact free communities. 232 Administrative law scholars have noted that the
benefits of notice-and-comment rulemaking include transparency and

229. See, e.g., NANCY G. LAVIGNE & VERA KACHNOWSKI WITH JEREMY TRAVIS, REBECCA
NASER & CHRISTY VISHER, A PORTRAIT OF PRISONER REENTRY IN MARYLAND 2 (2003),
available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/410655_MDPortraitReentry.pdf (59% of
prisoners released in Maryland in 2001 returned to Baltimore City, and most of them returned to a
few poor neighborhoods in Baltimore, some of which received more than 200 prisoners in a
year—more than many Maryland counties.); Roberts, supra note 7, at 1276 (“72% of all of New
York State’s prisoners came from only 7 of New York City’s 55 community board districts” and
“53% of Illinois prisoners released in 2001 returned to Chicago.”).
230. Mass. Dep’t of Corr., Reentry Policy, 103 DOC 493 (Oct. 15, 2008), available at
http://www.mass.gov/Eeops/docs/doc/policies/493.pdf.
231. Neb. Dep’t of Corr. Serv., Release Preparation, No. 209.01 (Mar. 1, 1980), available at
http://www.corrections.state.ne.us/policies/files/ar209.01.pdf.
232. Prison grievance policies should be among the rules subject to rulemaking procedures. It
is true that federal APA exempts agencies’ procedural rules from notice-and-comment
rulemaking. 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 117, § 6.5, at 350-53 (describing distinction between
substantive and procedural rules). However, prison grievance policies are more than mere
“bureaucratic housekeeping,” or instructions for navigating prison procedures. Cf. CORNELIUS
KERWIN, RULEMAKING: HOW GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WRITE LAW AND MAKE POLICY 23
(1995). They affect prisoners’ substantive rights, routinely determining whether they will be able
to seek relief for claimed constitutional violations. Accordingly, they should not automatically be
deemed solely “procedural” and exempt from notice-and-comment rulemaking. See Pickus v.
U.S. Bd. of Parole, 507 F.2d 1107, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (rejecting argument that Board of Parole
rules were mere statements of agency policy or procedural rules, on the grounds that they
“substantially affect[] the rights of persons subject to agency regulations”).
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accountability, information-gathering, and democratic participation. 233 Noticeand-comment rulemaking permits agencies to solicit information and technical
expertise. 234 In addition, rulemaking “provid[es] an effective way for members
of the public to organize.” 235 Rulemaking procedures can also improve
political accountability by permitting the chief executive and legislature to
monitor agencies’ work. 236 Thus, a notice-and-comment period should
enhance both the “accuracy” and the “legitimacy” of the resultant rule. 237
Given the vast numbers of incarcerated people, transparency,
accountability, and democratic participation in corrections policies are more
important than ever. Other avenues for democratic participation are closed to
prisoners and their communities, in ways both legal and practical. 238 Under
state felon disenfranchisement laws, some 5.3 million Americans have lost the
right to vote; this figure includes 1.4 million, or about 13% of all AfricanAmerican men. 239 Disenfranchisement is not the only way that mass
incarceration reduces the political power of poor communities; because the
incarcerated are counted as residents in the jurisdictions in which they are

233. KERWIN, supra note 232, at 53 (writing that the “core elements” of rulemaking are
“information, participation, and accountability”). See also BONFIELD, supra note 138, at §§ 5.2.1,
5.2.2 & 5.2.3, at 144-50 (describing the benefits of rulemaking as promoting rules that are
“lawful,” “technically sound,” and “politically responsible”); CARY COGLIANESE, HEATHER
KILMARTIN & EVAN MENDELSON, TRANSPARENCY AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN THE
RULEMAKING PROCESS 2-5 (July 2008) (arguing that an “optimal” level of public participation
can improve “legitimacy” and result in “more informed policy decisions”); 1 DAVIS & PIERCE,
supra note 117, at § 6.8 (describing the “many advantages of rules and rulemaking” as including
“political accountability” and “fairness”); Crowley, supra note 126, at 1518-19. See also Lee,
supra note 12, at 1747-50 (identifying benefits of formal speech policies in First Amendment
context as promoting “internal management”, “public accountability”, and “intergovernmental
accountability”).
234. Arthur E. Bonfield, Mandating State Agency Lawmaking by Rule, 2 B.Y.U. J. OF PUB. L.
161, 170 (1988) (“Agencies making policy by rule are . . . likely to have access to a broader base
of relevant information.”).
235. Arthur Earl Bonfield, The Quest for an Ideal State Administrative Rulemaking
Procedure, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 617, 618 (1991); Bonfield, supra note 234, at 170 (“[N]otice
and comment procedures typically used in the state agency rulemaking process permit and
facilitate intervention in that process by members of the general public.”).
236. See BONFIELD, supra note 138, § 4.2.3, at 108 (noting that the governor and state
legislative committees can more easily track rulemaking than some other forms of agency
lawmaking); 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 117, § 7.11, at 511 (noting that rulemaking is
“transparent” and the notice of a proposed rule gives other political actors an opportunity to affect
policy).
237. Anthony, supra note 130, at 1373.
238. See Aman, Globalization, supra note 123, at 126 (“[P]risoners, as well as other needy
citizens in our society, are not likely to have much impact in normal political arenas; accordingly,
they have particular needs for transparency and participation in the processes that affect them
directly.”). Cf. Lee, supra note 12, at 1715 (noting interaction between incarceration rates and the
ability of communities “to pursue autonomy and self-fulfillment”).
239. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS IN THE UNITED
STATES (2008), available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/ fd_bs_fdlawsinus
.pdf.
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imprisoned for the purposes of legislative reapportionment, 240 their home
districts lose political influence. 241
Agency rulemaking is one avenue of participation that should remain
open. At a minimum, a comment period permits participation by community
leaders, social scientists, nonprofit social service agencies, medical and mental
health care providers, corrections professionals, corrections officers’ unions,
and faith-based organizations. Notice-and-comment rulemaking could serve as
an organizing tool for the families of prisoners 242 or even as a means of
gauging the views of prisoners. 243 In order for notice-and-comment procedures
to be effective, interested parties must take advantage of them to attempt to
affect policy and educate corrections authorities.
The utility of a notice-and-comment period for soliciting technical
expertise was demonstrated recently in the process that led to the promulgation
of the National Prison Rape Elimination Commission (“NPREC”) proposed
model standards. The NPREC, created by the Prison Rape Elimination Act of
2003, 244 was charged with drafting model standards for combating prison
sexual violence; the standards will be finalized and promulgated by the
Attorney General. 245 NPREC solicited public comments on its proposed
standards, producing important changes in a number of areas. 246 The NPREC
240. Marie Gottschalk, The Long Reach of the Carceral State: The Politics of Crime, Mass
Imprisonment, and Penal Reform in the United States and Abroad, 34 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 439,
444 (2009).
241. Pamela S. Karlan, Convictions and Doubts: Retribution, Representation and the Debate
Over Felon Disenfranchisement, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1147, 1161 (2004) (collective effect of felon
disenfranchisement laws is to “penalize not only actual wrong-doers, but also the communities
from which incarcerated prisoners come and the communities to which ex-offenders return by
reducing their relative political clout”).
242. Thanks to Molly Ryan Strehorn, WNEC Law ’09, for this suggestion. See also
GILMORE, GOLDEN GULAG, supra note 5, at 181-248 for an account of advocacy efforts by a
group of prisoners’ families.
243. See CITIZENS UNITED FOR A RESPONSIBLE BUDGET, 2007-2008 POLICY BRIEF: HOW
“GENDER RESPONSIVE PRISONS” HARM CALIFORNIA’S WOMEN AND CHILDREN 15-16 (2007),
available at http://www.nicic.org/Library/022859 (including comments of women prisoners in
opposition to proposed “gender-responsive” strategy believed to include prison expansion). The
public and inmates should also be able to participate in rulemaking regarding penal institutions in
order to enhance “public understanding and acceptance” of corrections rules. Carl A. Auerbach,
Administrative Rulemaking in Minnesota, 63 MINN. L. REV. 151, 245 (1979).
244. 42 U.S.C. § 15606(a) (2008).
245. See NATIONAL PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION COMMISSION, REPORT (June 2009),
available at http://nprec.us/files/pdfs/NPREC_FinalReport.PDF. After the Attorney General
promulgates standards, states that fail to adopt them can lose a portion of their federal funding for
prisons. 42 U.S.C. § 15607(c)(2) (2008) (providing that a state’s funding under grant programs
for prison purposes shall be reduced by 5% for each fiscal year unless the chief executive officer
certifies that the corrections authority is in full compliance with national standards, or will use 5%
of grant funds to achieve full compliance). As this Article goes to press, the Attorney General is
considering the Commission’s proposed model standards. Although the standards may be
amended before they are promulgated, the Commission’s process is a useful case study.
246. Thanks to Melissa Rothstein and Darby Hickey of Just Detention International for
sharing information and analysis regarding the NPREC comment period.
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process differed from typical agency rulemaking in some ways, since it was the
product of a special commission made up of political appointees with a
common mission. Nonetheless, it demonstrated the potential utility of a public
comment period.
Some changes to the NPREC standards made them more clear and
attainable. For example, the original draft NPREC standards required
“continuous direct sight and sound supervision of inmates necessary to prevent
sexual abuse.” 247 Corrections officials objected to this rule as overly
burdensome, 248 and prisoners’ rights advocates commented that the supervision
need not literally be continuous. 249 Accordingly, the standard was changed to
require supervision “necessary to protect inmates from sexual abuse.” 250
The final proposed standards responded more fully to other concerns that
were familiar to the Commission and addressed in the original draft, but that
were amplified in the comment period. One such example concerned the type
of prisoner complaints that would be deemed proper exhaustion for the
purpose of the PLRA exhaustion requirement. Commentators and advocates
have decried the PLRA exhaustion requirement as a bar to court intervention in
cases of custodial sexual abuse. 251 The original draft standard addressed this
issue by stating that “[a]ny report of sexual abuse made at any time after the
abuse, which names a perpetrator and is made in writing to the agency” would
be deemed to satisfy the PLRA exhaustion requirement; it also mandated that
corrections agencies make available at least one outside avenue of reporting. 252
During the comment period, litigators reiterated the problems their clients
247. STANDARDS FOR THE PREVENTION, DETECTION, RESPONSE, AND MONITORING OF
SEXUAL ABUSE IN ADULT PRISONS AND JAILS § PP-1, at 18 (Nat’l Prison Rape Elimination
Comm’n, Proposed Draft 2008) [hereinafter “DRAFT PROPOSED NPREC STANDARDS”] (on file
with author).
248. Legal Aid Society Prisoners’ Rights Project, Comments on the Draft National Prison
Rape Elimination Commission Standards for the Prevention, Detection, Response, and Monitoring
of Sexual Abuse in Adult Prisons and Jails 22 (2008) (on file with author) (“We have been told
that correctional personnel read this Standard to require one-on-one supervision of inmates . . . .”).
See also American Correctional Association, Comments on Proposed Prison Rape Elimination
Standards and Practices 3 (2008) (on file with author) (deleting the word “continuous” from the
proposed standard mandating sight and sound supervision of inmates “necessary to prevent sexual
abuse”).
249. Legal Aid Society Prisoners’ Rights Project, supra note 248, at 22 (“There is nothing to
be gained by this confusion, or by leaving jail and prison officials in the impossible position of
either claiming compliance with a Standard that they believe that they cannot meet or of
acknowledging deficiencies and risk losing funding.”). See also Letter from Sylvia Rivera Law
Project to the Nat’l Prison Rape Elimination Comm’n 4 (July 7, 2008) [hereinafter Sylvia Rivera
Law Project] (on file with author) (“We believe that the language of the standards should be
revised to clarify that sight and sound supervision need not always be literally continuous in every
situation in order to prevent sexual abuse.”).
250. STANDARDS FOR THE PREVENTION, DETECTION, RESPONSE, AND MONITORING OF
SEXUAL ABUSE IN ADULT PRISONS AND JAILS, § PP-3, at 10 (Nat’l Prison Rape Elimination
Comm’n 2009) [hereinafter “FINAL PROPOSED NPREC STANDARDS”].
251. Schlanger & Shay, supra note 114, at 148-49.
252. DRAFT NPREC STANDARDS, supra note 247, § RE-1, at 33.
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encountered with exhaustion requirements. Clients who reported sexual abuse
through outside channels offered by a corrections agency before filing suit were
deemed by the State and by a federal district court not to have properly
exhausted, because they failed to file a grievance. 253
The final proposed standard made more explicit the types of complaints
that will be deemed acceptable for PLRA exhaustion purposes and the time
when exhaustion will be deemed complete. It stated that an inmate has
exhausted administrative remedies for purposes of the PLRA when the agency
makes a final decision on a report of abuse or, if no decision is issued, ninety
days after the report has been made, “regardless of whether the report was
made by the inmate, made by a third party, or forwarded from an outside
official or office.” 254 The discussion accompanying the final proposed
standards explained more fully the problems with the PLRA exhaustion regime,
namely that (unless modified by the new NPREC standard) 255 it essentially
makes the institution’s grievance deadline the statute of limitations for claims
of sexual abuse. 256
The final proposed NPREC standards also demonstrated the educative
potential of comments, particularly in provisions concerning LGBT prisoners.
Some comments by LGBT advocates resulted in concrete changes to the
standards. For example, the final proposed standards prohibit the automatic
segregation of LGBT prisoners as well as the isolation of vulnerable
prisoners, 257 an issue that the original draft standards had addressed in the
253. Legal Aid Society Prisoners’ Rights Project, supra note 248, at 7 (describing how the
exhaustion decision in Amador v. Superintendents of the Department of Correctional Services,
No. 03 CV 00650, 2007 WL 4326747 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2007) “reflects some of the obstacles to
the use of litigation to redress patterns of sexual abuse by staff”).
254. FINAL PROPOSED NPREC STANDARDS, supra note 250, § RE-2, at 34. The final
proposed standard also contained a provision for “seeking immediate protection from imminent
sexual abuse”; such complaints are deemed exhausted forty-eight hours after a prisoner has
notified a staff member of a need for protection. Id.
255. FINAL PROPOSED NPREC STANDARDS, supra note 250, § RE-2, at 34 (“A report of
sexual abuse triggers the ninety-day exhaustion period regardless of the length of time that has
passed between the abuse and the report.”). The final proposed standard on audits also was more
specific. Compare DRAFT PROPOSED NPREC STANDARDS, supra note 247, at § SA-2 (providing
that the chief executive of each jurisdiction “must certify the agency’s compliance with these
standards based on results from annual audits of the standards conducted by independent auditors .
. . .”) with FINAL PROPOSED NPREC STANDARDS, supra note 250, § AU-1 (requiring publicly
available independent audits “at least every three years.”).
256. FINAL PROPOSED NPREC STANDARDS, supra note 250, § RE-2, discussion at 35
(“Policies that require inmates to navigate a complicated grievance procedure within a short time
after the abuse can result in the dismissal of meritorious legal claims by victims of sexual
abuse.”).
257. FINAL PROPOSED NPREC STANDARDS, supra note 250, § SC-2, at 30 (“Lesbian, gay,
bisexual, transgender, or other gender-nonconforming inmates are not placed in particular
facilities, units or wings solely on the basis of their sexual orientation, genital status, or gender
identity. Inmates at high risk for sexual victimization may be placed in segregated housing only
as a last resort and then only until an alternative means of separation from likely abusers can be
arranged.”).
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discussion section and that advocates had urged making a part of the standards
themselves. 258 To facilitate appropriate methods of protecting at-risk prisoners,
the final proposed standard on screening lists specific pieces of information that
are to be elicited at intake (e.g., the inmate’s sexual orientation and perception
of vulnerability), 259 another suggestion made by advocates for LGBT
prisoners. 260 Also in response to comments from LGBT advocates, 261 the final
proposed standards use the term “gender non-conforming” to refer to persons
who may not identify as LGBT but whose gender expression does not match
gender stereotypes. 262 Indeed, the terms “gender identity,” “gender nonconforming,” and “transgender,” which had been absent from the original draft
standards, were included in the definition section of the final proposed
standards. 263 In a gain for the transgender community, the discussion
accompanying the final proposed standards suggests that corrections officials
refrain from automatically assigning inmates housing based on their birth
gender or genital status, 264 language likely prompted by suggestions. 265
Other comments offered by LGBT advocates were not adopted, such as a
plea that corrections officials acknowledge consensual sex among inmates and
provide condoms. 266 Nonetheless, raising these issues has the potential to

258. Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Comments on Standards for Adult Prisons
and Jails 8 (2008) (“The portions of the Discussion section stating that vulnerable inmates should
be housed in the least restrictive setting possible and must have access to the same privileges and
programs as inmates housed in general population are so crucial for safety and well-being that
they should be reflected in the Standards themselves and not simply in the Discussion section.”);
Sylvia Rivera Law Project, supra note 249, at 12 (arguing against the automatic segregation of
transgender prisoners).
259. FINAL PROPOSED NPREC STANDARDS, supra note 250, § SC-1, at 27 (providing in part
that “[a]t a minimum, employees use the following criteria to screen male inmates for risk of
victimization: mental or physical disability, young age, slight build, first incarceration in prison or
jail, nonviolent history, prior convictions for sex offenses against an adult or child, sexual
orientation of gay or bisexual gender nonconformance (e.g., transgender or intersex identity), prior
sexual victimization, and the inmate’s own perception of vulnerability”).
260. Transgender, Gender Variant & Intersex Justice Project et al., Comments on Standards
for Adult Prisons and Jails 13 (2008) (“The Classification scheme needs to have more specifics,
and include a set of ‘must have’ pieces of information, such as the person’s gender identity, their
concerns and wishes, etc.”).
261. Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, supra note 258, at 3.
262. FINAL PROPOSED NPREC STANDARDS, supra note 250, § SC-2, at 30-31.
263. Compare Id., glossary at 3-7, with DRAFT PROPOSED NPREC STANDARDS, supra note
247, glossary at 10-15.
264. FINAL PROPOSED NPREC STANDARDS, supra note 250, § SC-2, discussion at 31 (“The
Commission also strongly urges agencies to give careful thought and consideration to the
placement of each transgender inmate and not to automatically place transgender individuals in
male or female housing based on their birth gender or current genital status.”).
265. Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, supra note 258, at 8 (“We recommend
specifying that the housing preference of transgender inmates to be placed in male or female
general population (or alternative settings) should be taken into consideration when making
placement decisions.”).
266. For example, LGBT advocates had urged the Commission to acknowledge the existence
of consensual sex between prisoners and to provide condoms. Lambda Legal Defense and
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educate some Commissioners (and corrections professionals) about the
concerns of members of a community and their advocates.
Corrections rulemaking procedures can provide a forum for debate about
issues of great public importance. After challenges to lethal injection
procedures under state administrative procedure acts succeeded in California
and in Maryland, 267 these states commenced promulgating lethal injection
protocols pursuant to notice-and-comment rulemaking. In Maryland, the
rulemaking process promises to be a debate about both treatment of the accused
and the death penalty itself. 268 In California, public hearings and notice-andcomment also have become a debate about the death penalty. 269 Arguably,
exchanging views about capital punishment in the context of state rulemaking
promotes democratic participation and political accountability more than airing
these issues in federal litigation. 270
Given the utility of notice-and-comment procedures, state administrative
procedure act exceptions for “internal” policies should not be interpreted too
broadly, and they certainly should not encompass all corrections regulations.271
Aside from prisons, there are other entities whose regulations apply to largely
“closed” systems that could affect public health and safety. Nuclear power
plants, for example, affect public health and safety and are subject to noticeand-comment rulemaking provisions. 272 Moreover, as discussed in Part II.B,
even prison rules focused at inmates—for example, rules about security,
visitation, mail, and medical and mental health care—affect free
communities. 273
Education Fund, supra note 258, at 2. They also had asked that transgender prisoners be
permitted to identify the gender of those best qualified to search them, and that language regarding
pregnancy and vaginal penetration be made gender-neutral so as to include transgender men.
These suggestions were not adopted. Transgender, Gender Variant & Intersex Justice Project et
al., supra note 260, at 5-6, 11, 21.
267. Morales v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 724 (Cal Ct. App. 2008) (concluding
that lethal injection protocol was subject to provisions of California’s Administrative Procedure
Act); Evans v. State, 914 A.2d 25 (Md. 2006) (concluding that lethal injection protocol was not
adopted in accordance with provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act and thus “may not be
used until such time as they are properly adopted”).
268. Laura Smitherman, Maryland Moves Toward Resuming Executions: O’Malley
Reluctantly Approves New Protocols for Carrying Out Death Penalty, BALTIMORE SUN, June 25,
2009; John Wagner, Md. Panel Slows Down Draft of Execution Rules, WASH. POST, Oct. 12,
2009.
269. Carol J. Williams, Death Penalty Opponents Speak Out, L.A. TIMES, June 30, 2009, at
A4.
270. Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1542 (2008) (Alito, J., concurring) (arguing that Eighth
Amendment litigation regarding methods of execution is being used as a means of halting the
death penalty through “litigation gridlock”). But see Ty Alper, The Truth About Physician
Participation in Lethal Injection, 88 N.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (rejecting notion that
lawyers advocating humane methods of execution are merely seeking abolition).
271. Massey v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Pub. Safety and Corr. Servs., 886 A.2d 585, 599 (Md. 2005)
(quoting BONFIELD, supra note 138, § 6.17.02, at 402).
272. Cf. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
273. BONFIELD, supra note 138, § 6.17.7, at 414 (arguing that in states in which rules
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Whether prison and jail regulations are subjected to some type of formal
vetting process should determine how much deference they are accorded by
courts. 274 If the reasoning of Turner is that running a prison requires
“expertise” and “planning,” 275 such qualities are more clearly demonstrated
when corrections officials follow the same types of rulemaking processes that
other government agencies observe. 276 In the context of federal prison
litigation, in which comity is so important, deference to state corrections
regulations is arguably more appropriate when those regulations are
promulgated pursuant to state administrative law procedures. 277
In federal administrative law, the amount of deference accorded agency
rules depends, in part, on the procedures used to promulgate them. Of course,
outside of the corrections context, unlike under Turner, rules that impinge on
constitutional rights are not entitled to deference. 278
More generally,
“legislative” rules, enacted pursuant to APA notice-and-comment rulemaking
procedures, have the force of law and may “impose distinct obligations on
members of the public.” 279 By contrast, “interpretive” rules, or policy
statements that are promulgated without notice-and-comment, are accorded
affecting only inmates are exempt from state administrative procedure acts, visitation restrictions
are not exempt from notice-and-comment rulemaking because they affect visitors as well as
prisoners).
274. Lee, supra note 12, at 1752-53, 1773 (arguing that “formal speech policies” in
government institutions such as prisons do not merit judicial deference unless they “result from an
open and deliberative process,” including “reasonable notice and an opportunity to comment,” and
suggesting that this will not be true in prison systems that are exempt from notice-and-comment
rulemaking); Cf. WILLIAM F. FOX, UNDERSTANDING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 320 (2003) (arguing
in the federal APA context that interpretive rules should receive less deference from courts than
substantive rules because they have not “survived the fire of notice and comment”).
275. Giles, supra note 88, at 85.
276. Before the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (“CRIPA”) was amended by the
PLRA, it required prisoners to exhaust administrative remedies only when those administrative
procedures were certified as “plain, speedy, and effective,” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)(1)(2009). See
Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 523-24 (2002).
277. Cf. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 361 (1996) (emphasizing the need for “local
experimentation” and “adequate consideration [for] the views of state prison authorities”); Preiser
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 491 (1973) (“It is difficult to imagine an activity in which a State has
a stronger interest, or one that is more intricately bound up with state laws, regulations, and
procedures, than the administration of its prisons.”).
278. See 33 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ANDREW D. LEIPOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 8351 (4th ed. 2008) (“When a regulation affects fundamental rights, review will be
more searching and will assure that the rule is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state
interest.”). See, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-02 (1993) (Substantive due process
“forbids the government to infringe certain ‘fundamental’ liberty interests at all . . . unless the
infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.”); Preminger v. Sec’y of
Veterans Affairs, 517 F.3d 1299, 1305, 1310-11 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“[W]e review the
constitutionality of a regulation without deference to the agency.”). See also 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(B)
(2006) (directing courts to invalidate any agency action “contrary to constitutional right, power,
privilege or immunity”); BONFIELD, supra note 138, § 9.2.12(a), at 573-74 (explaining that section
5-116 of the 1981 Model State Administrative Procedure Act “provides that an agency rule is
invalid if the rule is unconstitutional on its face or as applied”).
279. 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 117, § 6.4, at 325.
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deference based on their “power to persuade.” 280 Factors in this analysis
include “the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its
reasoning, [and] its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements.”281 In
the corrections context as well, it makes sense to reward transparent and
participatory rulemaking processes with deference and subject rules issued
under more opaque and informal processes to greater scrutiny.
B. Anticipating Criticisms of Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking.
A number of criticisms may be leveled at the notion of subjecting prison
and jail regulation to the requirements of state administrative procedure acts.
Some might fear that further bureaucratic requirements will undermine prison
security. However, regulations governing many high risk industries and
activities—including highway safety, 282 emissions policies, 283 and drug
approval 284 —are promulgated through normal administrative procedure acttype proceedings.
Another criticism is that promulgating corrections rules under notice-andcomment procedures is simply impractical. Prison officials might get bogged
down in paperwork. 285 There are just too many rules governing prisons and
jails, this argument goes, and corrections agencies are too intimately involved
in the lives of prisoners to make rules under notice-and-comment
procedures. 286 A related argument is that members of the public are not
“directly affected” by prison rules and such rules are better left to prison
officials who have corrections expertise. 287
To the extent that members of the public were not affected by prison rules
when the 1981 Model State Administrative Procedure Act was promulgated, it
is much less true today, given skyrocketing incarceration rates. As discussed in
this Article, mass incarceration directly affects millions of prisoners and, by
extension, their families and communities. Now more than ever, there is a need
280. Id. § 6.4, at 325, 335.
281. Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (“The weight of [rulings, interpretations,
and opinions of the agency] will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the
validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those
factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”). See also United States v.
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234 (2001) (“[A]n agency’s interpretation may merit some deference
whatever its form, given the ‘specialized experience and broader investigations and information’
available to the agency.”).
282. Cf. JERRY MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY 10-11
(1990) (describing NHTSA rulemaking history and movement away from rulemaking and towards
reliance on auto recalls).
283. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
284. Cf. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009).
285. Adams v. Dep’t of Corr., 469 So.2d 164, 165 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (“[R]ulemaking
was not intended to affect fundamental prison administration or inundate each prison
superintendent with unrelenting paperwork.”).
286. BONFIELD, supra note 138, § 6.17.7, at 416.
287. Id.
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for public participation in corrections rulemaking. Public participation is
especially important in areas like prisoner release, reentry, and medical and
mental health care, all of which can have an impact on outside communities.
Certainly, some states already engage in notice-and-comment rulemaking
for many types of corrections regulations without apparent problem. 288 To
reduce administrative burden, state legislatures adopting notice-and-comment
could limit the categories of corrections rules subject to rulemaking. Public
input could be restricted to policies that have the greatest impact on families,
communities, and prisoners’ substantial rights. 289 States abolishing blanket
exemptions could also adopt pared-down procedures for corrections
regulations. The procedural complexity of state administrative procedure act
notice-and-comment provisions vary widely, providing a number of models. 290
Others might ask whether imposing more onerous rulemaking
requirements on prison and jail regulation will prompt corrections officials to
stop promulgating such regulations and revert to more informal policies. For
instance, the Supreme Court noted in Sandin that a constitutional due process
analysis focused on the wording of corrections regulations produced
“disincentives for States to codify prison management procedures.” 291
Although this type of retrenchment may happen on the margins,
corrections has become so professionalized over the past forty years that
wholesale reversion to informal processes seems unlikely. 292 Indeed, Feeley
and Swearingen have written that “no one—prison inmate or correctional
officer alike—would now seriously entertain the idea of turning back the clock
to the pre-bureaucratic prison [because] the awesome new problems

288. For example, the CDCR web site lists policies that are pending notice-and-comment.
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Regulations/Adult_Operations/Pending_Rules_Page.html (last visited
Oct. 30, 2009). Proposed rule changes are also listed on the Wisconsin Department of Corrections
web site, http://www.wi-doc.com/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2009). On the Wisconsin experience with
corrections rule-making, see Walter J. Dickey, The Promise and Problems of Rulemaking in
Corrections: The Wisconsin Experience, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 285, 304-22 (1983) (describing initial
experience of corrections rulemaking under state Administrative Procedure Act during four-year
period beginning in 1978, and identifying benefits including “clear identification of program
objectives,” reduction of unwarranted complexity in rules, “revision of policy to comply with
existing legal requirements,” and “more effective training of correctional staff”).
289. Cf. Pickus v. U.S. Bd. of Parole, 507 F.2d 1107, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (concluding that
Board of Parole rules were subject to notice-and-comment rulemaking because they “substantially
affect[] the rights of persons subject to agency regulations”); 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 117,
§§ 6.3-6.4, at 316-49 (distinguishing between “legislative” rules, which are subject to notice-andcomment rulemaking and have the force of law, and “interpretive” rules and policy statements).
290. Contrast CAL. GOV’T CODE § 11346.9(a)(3) (West 2005) (requiring “a summary of each
objection or recommendation made regarding the specific adoption, amendment, or repeal
proposed, together with an explanation of how the proposed action has been changed to
accommodate each objection or recommendation, or the reasons for making no change”), with
MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T § 10-113 to -114 (LexisNexis 2004) (requiring that a unit indicate
changes in the text of a proposed or adopted regulation).
291. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 482 (1995).
292. See supra notes 51-53.
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confronting prisons can be handled as well as they have been only as a
consequence of the enhanced capacities brought about by increased
bureaucratization.” 293 Other forces bolster professionalization; federal statutes
like the Prison Rape Elimination Act (“PREA”) provide incentives for the
promulgation of policies, 294 as do professional accreditation organizations. 295
More generally, administrative law scholars have warned that rulemaking
procedures can lead to “ossification” or even “petrification,” causing agencies
to cease issuing or amending rules. 296 This might be the result if legislatures
impose onerous rulemaking requirements, or reviewing courts require detailed
statements of reasons. 297 Possible ways of addressing this problem include
designing a notice-and-comment rulemaking procedure for the corrections
context that includes only critical elements or limiting judicial review. 298 It
seems unlikely, however, that courts will impose overly rigorous requirements
on corrections officials, given the long-standing norm of nearly complete
deference.
There is also reason to think that the rulemaking process in the corrections
context would be simpler than in other administrative law contexts. Unlike
other regulated areas, 299 there are relatively few well-funded and powerful
interests groups in corrections (guards’ unions being one), 300 which would
reduce the complexity and potential for abuse of the notice-and-comment
process. 301 State corrections rules are unlikely to be the subject of thousands of

293. Feeley & Swearingen, supra note 51, at 470-71.
294. See also Feeley & Swearingen, supra note 51, at 451 (discussing how federal statutes
like the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA) and the Violent Crime and Law
Enforcement Act of (1994) provide national standards for corrections and promote
professionalization).
295. FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 21, at 162-63.
296. See 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 117, § 7.11, at 511-13; MASHAW & HARFST, supra
note 282, at 10-11, 172-201 (describing rulemaking deadlock at NHTSA); Richard J. Pierce,
Rulemaking and the Administrative Procedure Act, 32 TULSA L.J. 185, 195-96 (1996) (quoting
Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J.
1385 (1992)).
297. 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 117, § 7.8, at 492-96.
298. 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 117, § 7.12, at 369 (“If the Court perceives value in rules
and wants to preserve rulemaking as a tool potentially available to agencies, it must limit the
power of lower courts to compel agencies to accompany rules with detailed and encyclopedic
discussions of all issues, comments, data disputes, and alternatives.”).
299. Thomas O. McGarity, supra note 296, at 1397 (explaining that informal rulemaking has
provided “powerful political constituencies” with “ample opportunity to mobilize against”
proposed rules, and that “regulatees and their trade associations,” as well as “environmental and
consumer groups” have “fiercely resisted the rulemaking process, seeking to lard it up with
procedural, structural, and analytical trappings that have the predictable effect of slowing down
the agency”).
300. See GILMORE, GOLDEN GULAG, supra note 5, at 125 (describing the role of the
California prison guards’ union in advocating the expansion of the California prison system). Cf.
Dolovich, supra note 123, at 523-24 (discussing lobbying efforts by private corrections
companies).
301. See BONFIELD, supra note 138, § 2.1.2, at 31 (noting that state agencies on the whole
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pages of comments by hundreds of sophisticated parties, like in EPA or FDA
rulemaking proceedings. 302 Using online procedures could also simplify the
process, while simultaneously increasing transparency and opportunities for
participation. 303
A different type of concern is that by focusing on the regulation of mass
incarceration, we inadvertently strengthen an ever more bureaucratized prison
system, one that is clothed with an illusion of legitimacy. 304 Certainly, the
existence of regulations alone does not guarantee good implementation, and the
proliferation of bureaucratic procedures can in fact undermine effective
management. 305 Bad actors will no doubt ignore policies. 306 Nonetheless,
many commentators have concluded that, on balance, increased bureaucracy
protects prisoners and improves their living conditions, albeit at the cost of
some flexibility. 307
A related danger is that, while notice-and-comment rulemaking may be
officially required, in actuality, it may be circumvented or gutted. 308 For
example, Feeley and Swearingen surveyed the CDCR rulemaking process and
found that the CDCR overused exceptions to California Administrative
deal with less affluent people, who are often not represented by lawyers).
302. Cf. 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 117, § 7.4, at 444 (describing rulemaking proceedings
in federal agencies).
303. See Barbara H. Brandon & Robert D. Carlitz, Online Rulemaking and Other Tools for
Strengthening Our Civil Infrastructure, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 1421, 1442-43 (2002) (discussing
increased transparency and exchange of information as among the benefits of online rulemaking).
See, e.g., New Jersey Department of Corrections’ Home Page, http://www.state.nj.us/corrections
(last visited Oct. 22, 2009).
304. Feeley & Swearingen, supra note 51, at 468 (noting that “there is an irony in . . . seeking
to protect individual rights by strengthening prison administration”).
305. The National Commission on Correctional Health Care (NCCHC) has stated that the
Michigan Department of Corrections medical system was “one of the most bureaucratic systems
we have ever encountered,” to the detriment of its ability to provide adequate health care. See
Alexander, supra note 169, at 14.
306. See, e.g., Stewart v. Lyles, 66 Fed. App’x 18, 20 (7th Cir. 2003) (describing how
corrections officers at the Illinois Stateville prison conducted strip and body cavity searches on
male prisoners in front of other inmates and female supervisors, and when told of a policy
forbidding such searches, the officers said that they did not “care about the paper,” until a female
supervisor intervened on the prisoners’ behalf).
307. Feeley & Swearingen, supra note 51, at 468. See also Sturm, supra note 48, at 49
(“Many scholars argue that the move toward bureaucracy has led to safer, less arbitrary, and more
human institutions.”).
308. I thank faculty reviewer Malcolm Feeley for pushing my thinking on this point and for
sharing his unpublished manuscript with the results of his study, Feeley & Swearingen, supra note
154. See also Marjorie Cohn, The Evisceration of the Attorney-Client Privilege in the Wake of
September 11, 2001, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1233, 1234, 1244 (2003) (describing how thenAttorney General Ashcroft promulgated, without notice-and-comment, “emergency interim” BOP
regulation permitting government to eavesdrop on attorney-client conversations); Susan N.
Herman, Introduction: David G. Trager Public Policy Symposium: Our New Federalism?
National Authority and Local Autonomy in the War on Terror, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1201, 1223
(2004) (describing how, in the wake of 9/11, INS Commissioner, without notice-and-comment,
“signed an emergency interim regulation superseding state law by prohibiting state jail officials
from disclosing the identities of the detainees held on behalf of the INS”).
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Procedure Act rulemaking. 309 Local rules are completely exempt from the
California Administrative Procedure Act and emergency rules are exempt for
160 days. 310 Between 1996 and 1999, the CDCR passed 76% of its rules
through the emergency procedure, 311 a troublingly high percentage. In
response, the California Law Revision Commission recommended that
emergency rules be subjected to review by the Office of Administrative
Law. 312 Subsequently, in the period from 2005 to 2007, the percentage of rules
adopted through the emergency procedure dropped to 20%. 313
On the other hand, some might argue that more formal rulemaking
procedures ultimately will limit prison officials’ ability to exercise judgment.
Administrative law scholars have described the trade-offs of limiting
discretion. 314 An often-criticized example of an effort to restrict discretion and
promote transparency in the criminal justice realm was sentencing reform. In
the 1980s, the federal system, followed by many states, implemented
sentencing guidelines. 315
Although liberal reformers had championed
guidelines as a means of reducing unwarranted disparity, 316 a byproduct of this
set of reforms was increased harshness and the elimination of judges’ ability to
grant individualized mercy. 317 Certainly, there is danger in reducing individual
discretion. However, prison and jail systems already have policies and
regulations; this Article argues that those regulations should be subject to
greater public input. Moreover, sentencing reform was accompanied by other
measures that ratcheted up sentences, including mandatory minimums and
“three-strikes” statutes, at a moment when America was bent on exacting
punishment. 318 There is no inherent reason why greater rationality should
produce increased harshness.
309. Feeley & Swearingen, supra note 154, at 31-38.
310. Id. at 29-30.
311. Id. at 37.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. See KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 25 (1969) (describing the
importance and danger of discretion in a criminal justice context).
315. See Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative
History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223 (1993).
316. Stith & Koh, supra note 315, at 226-30 (describing how “liberal reformers” advocated
replacing indeterminate sentencing with sentencing guidelines).
317. See Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., The Death of Discretion? Reflections on the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1938, 1956 (1988) (“To rectify the guidelines’
principal shortcomings, the Commission should propose to Congress specific amendments
designed to increase judges’ discretion to consider a broad range of individual offender
characteristics.”). Of course, the guidelines were later declared advisory by the U.S. Supreme
Court. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (concluding that the mandatory nature of the
sentencing guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment).
318. See ELSNER, supra note 77, at 18-23 (describing the combined effects of the “war on
drugs,” mandatory minimum sentences, and “three-strikes” laws); MARC MAUER, THE RACE TO
INCARCERATE 56-78 (1999) (describing how the “tough on crime” movement of the Reagan/Bush
years continued through the Clinton administration).
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Exempting corrections regulation from important mechanisms of public
oversight deprives us of a much-needed accountability mechanism. 319 The
point is not to increase the sheer volume of regulation, but to enact policies
through transparent mechanisms with opportunity for public input. The need
for public accountability is particularly great in what Justice Kennedy has
described as the “hidden world of punishment.” 320 Former Oklahoma Warden
Jack Conley told the Commission on Safety and Abuse in America’s Prisons
that “[w]hen we are not held accountable, the culture inside the prisons
becomes a place that is so foreign to the culture of the real world that we
develop our own ways of doing things.” 321
Of course, greater opportunities for public participation will not
necessarily translate into more enlightened corrections regulations. Our current
policy of mass incarceration illustrates this point: Commentators have
described how criminal punishment has become more punitive since the 1960s,
fueled in part by racial fears and stereotypes. 322 However, eliminating
democratic participation is not the solution to this problem. The answer is
“more politics” 323 —to engage in the administrative process and facilitate the
participation of relatively disadvantaged affected communities in commenting
on corrections policy.
Nonetheless, some might counter (with considerable force) that only
decarceration will solve the problems of America’s prisons. 324 With America’s

319. COMMISSION ON SAFETY AND ABUSE IN AMERICA’S PRISONS, CONFRONTING
CONFINEMENT 79-88 (2006), available at http://www.prisoncommission.org/pdfs/Confronting_C
onfinement.pdf (discussing need for both external oversight and internal accountability measures).
320. Anthony M. Kennedy, Speech at the American Bar Association Annual Meeting (Aug.
9, 2003), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_08-09-03.html, in
TRAVIS, supra note 1, at 3. Cf. Austin Sarat & Conor Clarke, Beyond Discretion: Prosecution, the
Logic of Sovereignty and the Limits of Law, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 387, 412-13 (June 2008)
(describing a “legal borderland” as a place where “meaningful constraints on officials meet their
limits”).
321. COMMISSION ON SAFETY AND ABUSE IN AMERICA’S PRISONS, supra note 319, at 6.
Margaret Winter, Associate Director of the ACLU National Prison Project, told the Commission
that what prisons need is “light, light, and more light.” Id. at 77. In its report, the Commission
recommended additional measures to ensure accountability. Id. at 6-7.
322. See Steven E. Barkan & Steven F. Cohn, Why Whites Favor Spending More Money to
Fight Crime: The Role of Racial Prejudice, 52 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 300, 301, 310 (2005)
(summarizing research suggesting that public opinion and specifically racial prejudices motivated
“get tough” crime policies, and analyzing data from the General Social Survey to conclude that
racially prejudiced whites favor increased spending on crime control). Thanks to Valerie Jenness
for raising this point.
323. My thinking on this point was influenced by comments by James Forman, Jr., who made
a plea for “more politics, less law” in presenting his paper Isolation, Empathy, and Crime, at the
LatCrit XIV conference on Oct. 3, 2009.
324. Professor Todd Clear spoke of the need to focus on reversing mass incarceration. Audio
Recording: Symposium on The Road to Prison Reform: Treating the Causes and Conditions of
Our Overburdened System, held by the Connecticut Public Interest Law Journal, (Feb. 6, 2009),
available at http://www.law.uconn.edu/content/road-prison-reform (follow “Download the MP3”
hyperlink under Panel 2). See David Cole, Can Our Shameful Prisons Be Reformed? 56 NEW
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imprisoned population topping the charts, we should focus on decarceration,
rather than adjusting to a system of mass incarceration. 325 Although there have
been encouraging moves in that direction, accelerated by the cost burden of
mass incarceration in the context of a global economic recession, 326 the need
for transparency in corrections policy-making persists, even if the United States
pursues a policy of decarceration. Until our reliance on mass incarceration is
reduced, prison and jail regulations will continue to have a major impact on
poor communities. So long as prisons and jails exist, the policies that regulate
them should be subject to public scrutiny.
CONCLUSION
Corrections regulations are administrative law incarcerated. When we
ignore corrections policies, we turn a blind eye to a body of law that directly
governs millions of Americans. If courts fail to analyze such rules with rigor,
or delegate to them the final say over whether prisoners will be heard by courts,
they reinforce the race, class, and gender hierarchies of mass incarceration.327
These failings will surely haunt us, for the injustices done in prisons and jails
can seep out. With the world’s largest incarcerated population, we cannot
countenance a “hands-off” doctrine in any form. It is time that we subject
prison and jail regulation to greater public scrutiny.

YORK REV. BOOKS, November 19, 2009 (arguing for a reduction in the U.S. prison population on
both practical and moral grounds). See also Sylvia Rivera Law Project, supra note 249, at 5
(“The more investment we as a society make in our prisons and jails and the less in real resources
for our communities, the more human beings end up incarcerated and the more violence happens
both inside and outside of correctional facilities.”).
325. Todd R. Clear & James Austin, Reducing Mass Incarceration: Implications of the Iron
Law of Prison Populations, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 307, 316-24 (2009) (urging sentencing
reform to reduce the number of people who go to prison and the length of time they stay there).
See also MICHAEL JACOBSON, DOWNSIZING PRISONS (2005); Marie Gottschalk, Dismantling the
Carceral State: The Future of Penal Policy Reform, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1693, 1696 (2006) (“My
vision of penal reform is premised on not just halting the expansion of the carceral state but on
dismantling it.”); David Rudovsky, A Closing Keynote: A Comment on Mass Incarceration in the
United States, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 207, 214 (2009) (“We ought to be doing more than just
tinkering at the edges.”).
326. On August 4, 2009, a panel of three federal judges ordered the CDCR to reduce its
prison population by nearly 43,000 prisoners, concluding that overcrowding stemming from
“tough-on-crime politics” had created unconstitutional conditions in the system. Coleman v.
Schwarzenegger, No. Civ. S-90-0520, 2009 WL 2430820, at *115-16 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2009);
Carol J. Williams, State gets Two Years to Cut 43,000 from Prisons, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2009, at
A1. Changes are being discussed in Washington, D.C. as well. On March 26, 2009, Senator Jim
Webb introduced a bill in the U.S. Senate to establish a commission to overhaul America’s
criminal justice system and reduce our reliance on incarceration, the National Criminal Justice
Commission Act of 2009, S. 714, 111th Cong. (2009). Senator Webb’s website cites the fact that
the U.S. has 5% of the world’s population, but 25% of the incarcerated prisoners, and states that
“America’s criminal justice system has deteriorated to the point that it is a national disgrace.”
http://webb.senate.gov/email/criminaljusticereform.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2009).
327. Cf. Buchanan, supra note 8, at 49-50; Siegel, supra note 82, at 2119-20; Loury, supra
note 9, at 36-37.
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APPENDIX
Jurisdiction

Exempt from
State
Administrative
Procedure Act
Rulemaking?

Source of Information

328

Alabama

Express
exemption from
rulemaking

Alaska

Bound
rulemaking

by

ALA. CODE § 41-22-3(9)(g)(1) (2000): The
term “rule” does not include rules relating to
“the conduct of inmates of public institutions
and prisoners on parole.” 329
The Commissioner may adopt “regulations,”
under sections 44.28.030 and 33.30.021 of
the Alaska Statute, 330 which are defined
under the Alaska Administrative Procedure
Act and subject to notice-and-comment
rulemaking.
ALASKA
STAT.
§
44.62.640(a)(3) (2008). The Commissioner
may also direct the development of a manual
of “policies and procedures,” ALASKA
ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, § 05.155 (2004), which
are not subject to notice-and-comment
rulemaking, 331 and which address many

328. The chart characterizes corrections rules as “exempt” or “partially exempt” if there is an
argument that they are exempt from rulemaking procedures under the state administrative
procedure act. It should not be interpreted as a definitive statement that all corrections regulations
are exempt from state administrative procedure act requirements. Jurisdictions that are described
as “bound” are those that require a tier of rules be promulgated as regulations pursuant to noticeand-comment rulemaking. Those jurisdictions might also have other corrections policies—
perhaps more numerous and equally important—that are not subject to the provisions of the state
administrative procedure act.
329. See Gerthoffer v. Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 973 So.2d 355, 358-59 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007)
(discussing Alabama Code, ALA. CODE § 41-22-3(9)(g)(1) (2000), exemption).
330. ALASKA STAT. §§ 44.28.030, 33.30.021 (2008). See McGinnis v. Stevens, 570 P.2d
735, 741 (Alaska 1977) (Commissioner is “under a legislative mandate” to promulgate regulations
governing Alaska’s prisons.).
331. Wilson v. State, Dep’t of Corr., 127 P.3d 826, 828-29 (Alaska 2006) (“When an
administrative regulation is adopted under statutory authority, we review the regulation to
determine whether it is ‘consistent with and reasonably necessary to carry out the purposes of the
statutory provisions conferring rule-making authority on the agency’ and whether it is ‘reasonable
and not arbitrary’ considering the legislative purpose.”); Mathis v. Sauser, 942 P.2d 1117, 1123
nn.12-13 (Alaska 1997) (“Policies and procedures of state agencies need not conform to formal
requirements of the APA.”). See also Moody v. State, Dep’t of Corr., No. S-12303, 2007 WL
3197938, at *1 (Alaska 2007) (Alaska Administrative Procedure Act does not permit judicial
review of DOC administrative decision, but court will review “fundamental constitutional
question[s]”).
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Arizona

Express
exemption from
rulemaking

Arkansas

Bound by state
Administrative
Procedure Act
Express partial
exemption from
rulemaking

California

377

substantive areas.
State Administrative Procedure Act exempts
any “rule or substantive policy statement
concerning inmates or committed youth of a
correctional or detention facility.” 332
Bound by the state Administrative Procedure
Act. 333
Rules of “general application” are subject to
State
Administrative
Procedure
Act
procedures, see CAL. GOV’T CODE § 11346 et
seq. (West 2005), while rules that affect only
a single institution may be exempt. 334 See
CAL. PENAL CODE § 5058(c) (West 2008)
(“The following are deemed not to be
‘regulations’ as defined in Section 11342.600
of the Government Code: (1) Rules issued by
the director applying solely to a particular
prison or other correctional facility, provided
that the following conditions are met: (A) All

332. ARIZ. STAT. § 41-1005(A)(7) (2004). See also Stanhope v. State, 825 P.2d 25, 26 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1991) (concluding that a prisoner classification decision is not “subject to judicial review
under the Arizona Administrative Review Act”). But see Malumphy v. MacDougall, 610 P.2d
1044 (Ariz. 1980) (DOC regulations dealing with inmate classification are not just “internal”
because “the unfiled regulations materially affect the type of existence a sentenced prisoner will
endure, which ranges from ‘intensive’ custody, twenty-four-hour lockup, to ‘trusty.’ Regulations
of this type which affect such important interests are the type of regulations which must be filed
with the Secretary of State.”); Wilkinson v. State, 838 P.2d 1358, 1360 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992)
(“The DOC’s religious visitation rules concern not just the inmates, but also the religious leaders
who visit them.”).
333. Eldridge v. Bd. of Corr., 768 S.W.2d 534, 535-36 (Ark. 1989) (“[T]he Administrative
Procedure Act . . . applies to the various boards, commissions, departments, officers, or other
authorities of the State of Arkansas, with such exceptions as are set forth in Ark. Code Ann. § 2515-202(1)(B). The Department of Correction is not excepted and is therefore subject to the Act.”
However, the selection of a site for a correctional facility was not a “rule” within the meaning of
the Act.). But see Ark. Dep’t of Corr. v. Williams, No. 08-1031 (Ark. Oct. 29, 2009) (noting that
the Arkansas legislature amended section 5-4-617 of the Arkansas Code to exempt lethal injection
protocols from the state Administrative Procedure Act); Clinton v. Bonds, 816 S.W.2d 169, 171
(Ark. 1991) (ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-15-212(a) (2002): judicial review of contested cases is not
available to inmates, but Arkansas Supreme Court says inmates have a right to review of
fundamental constitutional questions.).
334. Morales v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 724 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (Lethal
injection protocol is “regulation” within the meaning of state Administrative Procedure Act and
does not fall within “single prison” or “internal management” exceptions); Stoneham v. Rushen,
203 Cal. Rptr. 20, 22-24 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (“standardized classification point-scoring system”
was a rule that had to be promulgated in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act;
judicial review was to determine whether regulation was within scope of agency’s statutory
authority and for arbitrariness).
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Colorado

Express
exemption from
rulemaking

Connecticut

Express partial
exemption from
rulemaking

[Vol. 14:329

rules that apply to prisons or other
correctional facilities throughout the state are
adopted by the director pursuant to Chapter
3.5 . . . (B) All rules except those that are
excluded from disclosure to the public . . . are
made available to all inmates confined in the
particular prison or other correctional facility
to which the rules apply and to all members
of the general public . . . .”). 335
COLO. REV. STAT. § 17-1-111 (2008): “The
provisions of this title relating to the
placement,
assignment,
management,
discipline, and classification of inmates shall
not be subject to section 24-4-103
[rulemaking], 24-4-105 [hearings], or 24-4106 [judicial review], C.R.S.”
Colo. Dep’t of Corr., Administrative
Regulation 100-01 (April 15, 2009),
available
at
https://exdoc.state.co.us/userfiles/regulations/
pdf/0100_01.pdf: “All ARs are policies and
guidelines only; therefore, they are exempt
under Title 24 of the Colorado Revised
Statutes, unless specifically stated in an AR
that it is subject to a public hearing.”
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4-166(13) (West
2007): The term “regulation” “does not
include (A) statements concerning only the
internal management of any agency and not
affecting private rights or procedures
available to the public . . . .” 336
§ 18-78a (West 2006): The state
Administrative Procedure Act “shall apply to

335. Also exempt are short-term criteria for placing inmates in new facilities or facilities
subject to closure and issues relating to security and investigations. CAL. PENAL CODE
§5058(c)(2)-(3) (West 2008). Compare Faunce v. Denton, 213 Cal. Rptr. 122 (Cal. Ct. App.
1985) (holding that rules regarding the amount of property prisoners could have in their cells were
rules of general application affecting population of men in custody and so subject to the state
Administrative Procedure Act), with In re Garcia, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 357 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998)
(holding that correspondence regulation was a local regulation exempt from the Administrative
Procedure Act).
336. Pierce v. Lantz, 965 A.2d 576, 579-81 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009) (concluding that DOC
regulations regarding censorship of “sexually explicit materials and compact discs with parental
advisory stickers” and price mark-ups on items in prison commissary were not “rules” within the
meaning of section 4-166(13) of the Connecticut Statute).
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the Department of Correction, except that in
adopting regulations in regard to riot control
procedures,
security
and
emergency
procedures,
disciplinary
action
or
classification the Department of Correction
shall not be required to follow the procedures
in sections 4-168, 4-168a, 4-168b, 4-172, 4173, 4-174 and 4-176. The Attorney General,
the legislative regulation review committee
and the General Assembly, in complying
with their duties in accordance with sections
4-169, 4-170 and 4-171, shall not make such
regulations in regard to riot control
procedures and security and emergency
procedures public.” 337
Section 4-166(2) also excludes Department
of Correction hearings from the definition of
“contested case.” § 4-166(2) (West 2007).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4322(d) (2001):
The “Department of Correction Policies and
Procedures, including any Policy, Procedure,
Post Order, Facility Operational Procedure or
Administrative Regulation adopted by a
Bureau, facility or department of the
Department of Correction shall be
confidential, and not subject to disclosure
except upon the written authority of the
Commissioner.” 338
D.C. CODE § 24-211.02 (2001): “The
Department of Corrections with the approval
of the Council of the District of Columbia
shall have power to promulgate rules and
regulations for the government of such
institutions and to establish and conduct
industries, farms, and other activities, to
classify the inmates, and to provide for their
proper treatment, care, rehabilitation, and

337. Beasley v. Comm’r of Corr., 718 A.2d 487, 495 (Conn. App. Ct. 1998).
338. Jackson v. Danberg, C.A. No. 07M-09-141 RRC, 2008 WL 1850585 (Del. Super. Ct.
2008), aff’d, 962 A.2d 256 (Del. 2008) (noting that the DOC has never promulgated a regulation
under the state Administrative Procedure Act).
339. Cf. Walton v. District of Columbia, 670 A.2d 1346 (D.C. 1996) (discussing Lorton
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reformation.” 339 But Program Statements for
the D.C. DOC are not subject to notice-andcomment procedures. http://doc.dc.gov/doc.
Florida

Partial
exemption from
rulemaking

Georgia

Express
exemption from
state
Administrative
Procedure Act
Partial
exemption from
rulemaking

Hawaii

Idaho

Express partial
exemption from
state
Administrative
Procedure Act

Provisions of section 120.54 of the Florida
Statute (Rulemaking) apply to Department of
Corrections with respect to rules of general
applicability, 340 but not rules affecting only a
single facility. 341 There is no judicial review
under the Administrative Procedure Act. 342
The “Board of Corrections and its penal
institutions” are exempt from the definition
of “agency.” GA. CODE ANN. § 50-13-2(1)
(2009).
Exempt under section 91-1(4) of the Hawaii
Statute. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 91-1(4)
(LexisNexis 2007) (The term “rule” does not
include “regulations concerning only the
internal management of an agency and not
affecting private rights of or procedures
available to the public”). 343
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 20-212 (1997): “The
state board of correction shall make all
necessary rules . . . . All rules of the board
shall be subject to the review of the
legislature . . . . But no other provisions of

Regulations Approval Act).
340. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.54 (West 2008); Dep’t of Corr. v. Holland, 469 So. 2d 166, 167
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (Policies that have “breath and application throughout the prison
system” must be promulgated pursuant to § 120.54, but policy regarding winter clothes affecting
only single prison was exempt.). See also Osterback v. Agwunobi, 873 So. 2d 437 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2004) (concluding that repeal of regulation regarding environmental conditions was invalid
exercise of rulemaking authority); Alexander v. Singletary, 626 So. 2d 333 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1993) (Policy should have been adopted by rule.).
341. Adams v. Dep’t of Corr., 469 So. 2d 164 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (Procedures
regarding obtaining copies for prisoners need not be promulgated pursuant to state Administrative
Procedure Act.).
342. Caldwell v. State, 821 So. 2d 374 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002); Quigley v. Fla. Dep’t of
Corr., 745 So. 2d 1029 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999); Hargrove v. Dep’t of Corr., 601 So. 2d 623
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (Prisoner was limited to grievance system to challenge Florida
Department of Corrections interpretation of its visitation rules.).
343. “The legislative history of [the Hawaii Administrative Procedure Act] discloses that
policy decisions regarding state penal institutions were considered to be regulations that involved
only the internal management of these institutions.” Tai v. Chung, 570 P.2d 563, 564 (Haw.
1977).
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chapter 52, title 67, Idaho Code, [Idaho
Administrative Procedure Act] shall apply to
the board, except as otherwise specifically
provided by statute.” Also, section 675201(2) provides that “agency” does not
include “state board of correction.” § 675201(2) (1995).
ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 2, § 850.120(c)-(d)
(2002): contemplates rulemaking pursuant to
the Illinois Administrative Procedure Act, 5
ILL. COMP. STAT. 100/1-1 et seq. (2008). 344
But facility rules need not be promulgated
under the state Administrative Procedure
Act. 345
The Commissioner is authorized to adopt
“departmental rules” under the state
Administrative Procedure Act, IND. CODE
ANN. § 11-8-2-5(b)(1) (West 2004), and is
required to develop policies “for committed
persons, for administration of facilities, and
for conduct of employees,” § 11-8-25(a)(8). 346 But see § 4-21.5-2-5(6) (West
2002) (exempting from the definition of
“agency action” an “agency action related to
an offender within the jurisdiction of the
department of correction”).
Iowa Administrative Code, IOWA ADMIN.
CODE r. 201-10.2(17A) (2009), sets out
procedures for rulemaking by the Department
of Corrections, but also recognizes an
exemption in the Iowa Code, IOWA CODE
ANN. § 17A.2(11)(k) (West 2005), which
states that the term “rule” does not include

344. In one case, a court concluded that the director of the Department of Corrections had
abused his discretion in refusing to grant good time credit based on an unwritten policy, saying it
was in violation of rulemaking policies under the Illinois Administrative Procedure Act,
Corrections Code, and Administrative Code. Guzzo v. Snyder, 762 N.E.2d 663, 667-68 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2002).
345. Cannon v. Quinley, 815 N.E.2d 443, 451-52 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004).
346. But see Conquest v. State Employee’s Appeals Comm’n, 565 N.E.2d 1086 (Ind. 1991)
(holding that a policy regarding hours for home visitation of parolees was not subject to
requirements of state Administrative Procedure Act under section 4-22-2-13(c)(1) of the Indiana
Code, which exempts rules which relate solely to internal policy, procedure, or organization. ).
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“[a] statement concerning only inmates of a
penal institution.” 347
Although Kansas corrections agencies are
subject to the provisions of the rules and
regulations filing act, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77437 (1997), the state Administrative
Procedure Act rulemaking provisions exempt
rules that “relate[] to the emergency or
security procedures of a correctional
institution,” § 77-415(4)(f).
Orders of
wardens also are exempt from an alternate
modified rulemaking procedure for rules
exempted from normal rulemaking. § 77421a (providing that “[t]his section shall not
apply to orders issued by directors of
correctional institutions under KSA § 755256 [orders of wardens]”). 348
Another
provision which exempts any rule or
regulation which “[r]elates to the internal
management or organization of the agency,”
§ 77-415(4)(a), has been interpreted to
exempt some corrections rules. 349 Section
77-603(c)(2) further provides that the Kansas
judicial review act does not apply to agency
actions “concerning the management,
discipline or release of persons in the custody
of the secretary of corrections.”
The Secretary of the Department of
Corrections is entrusted with the authority to
promulgate “administrative regulations,” KY.

347. See also Wycoff v. Iowa Dist. Court, 580 N.W.2d 786 (Iowa 1998) (IAPA has no
application to prison disciplinary hearings.). But see Brummer v. Iowa Dep’t of Corr., 661
N.W.2d 167, 168 n.1 (Iowa 2003) (reviewing Department of Corrections sex offender evaluation
under judicial review provision of Iowa Administrative Procedure Act, IOWA CODE ANN. §
17A.19 (West 2005)).
348. However, section 77-421(b) of the Kansas statute provides that the Department of
Corrections may permit inmates to be heard regarding a proposed rule or regulation that is the
subject of hearings under this section, although it is not required to do so. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77421(b) (1997).
349. See Vinson v. McKune, 960 P.2d 222 (Kan. 1998) (Rules regarding offender privileges
are exempt.). See also Gilmore v. McKune, 940 P.2d 78, 83 (Kan. Ct. App. 1997) (“Under K.S.A.
77-421a, orders issued by the director of a correctional facility are not subject to the filing and
publication requirements of K.S.A. 77-415 et seq., before taking effect. However, K.S.A. 1996
Supp. 75-5256(b) requires that the warden’s orders, other than those relating to emergency or
security procedures, be published and made available to all inmates.”).
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REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 197.020, 196.035
(LexisNexis 1999), which are defined in
Chapter 13A of the Kentucky Statute, and
promulgated
under
the
rulemaking
procedures of that section. The Department
of Corrections also has a Policies &
Procedures Manual, which is incorporated by
reference into the Kentucky Administrative
Regulations, 501 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 6:020
(2008), and which is developed internally,
available
at
http://www.corrections.ky.gov/about/chapter.
htm. 350
Requirements of the state
Administrative Procedure Act regarding
administrative hearings do not apply to
prison adjustment or grievance hearings. KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13B.020(3)(c)(2)
(LexisNexis 2003). 351
Policies that apply only to a particular
institution are exempt, 352 but other policies
constitute “rules” within the meaning of the
state Administrative Procedure Act. 353
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-A, § 1402
(1988): The commissioner shall establish
rules in accordance with the Maine
Administrative Procedure Act, title 5, chapter
375. But see ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §
9051 (2002) (stating that adjudicatory
proceedings
“involving
correctional

350. But see KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 197.020(3) (LexisNexis 1999) (“The department may
promulgate administrative regulations in accordance with KRS Chapter 13A to implement a
program that provides for reimbursement of telehealth consultations.”).
351. But see Hughes v. Ky. Dep’t of Corr., No. 2007-CA-001068-MR, 2008 WL 1921627, at
*2 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008) (“Kentucky has developed a standard of ‘some evidence’ for judicial
review of prison disciplinary proceedings.”).
352. Peterson v. Michael, 960 So.2d 1260 (La. Ct. App. 2007) (“[A] posted policy for a
particular facility, like DWCC’s Posted Policy #53 [relating to “strip cell” procedure], does not
have to be formally promulgated in the Louisiana Register.”).
353. Hills v. Cain, 764 So. 2d 1048, 1050 (La. Ct. App. 2000) (Institution’s policy that an
inmate must “specifically request that a tape recording be preserved for possible judicial review of
a disciplinary action” is a “rule” within the meaning of Louisiana Statute, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
49:951(6) (2003)); Rivera v. State, 727 So. 2d 609, 612-13 (La. Ct. App. 1998) (Department failed
to follow Administrative Procedure Act in issuing disciplinary rules); Sims v. Wackenhut, 708 So.
2d 1140, 1141 (La. Ct. App. 1998) (“The Department of Public Safety and Corrections operates
according to rules and regulations that it promulgated pursuant to the Administrative Procedure
Act.”).
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facilities” are not covered by the provisions
of the Maine Administrative Procedure Act).
The Department of Public Safety and
Correctional Services and DOC are subject to
the
provisions
of
the
Maryland
Administrative Procedure Act, 354 but the
exemption for rules affecting “internal
management” can encompass “the myriad of
rules governing the details of prison life.” 355
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30A, § 1A
(West 2001): “The department of correction
shall be subject to sections one through eight,
inclusive, and shall not otherwise be subject
to this chapter . . . .” The non-exempt
sections include rulemaking and judicial
review of regulations, but not adjudicative
proceedings.
MDOC Policy Directive 01.04.110 states that
administrative rules are promulgated under
the Administrative Procedure Act and have
the force of law. 356 Policy Directives clarify
and implement administrative rules and are
signed by the director. There are 189 policy
directives on the MDOC web site.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 14.03, subd. 3(b)(1)
(West 2005): Definition of a “rule” for
purposes of the administrative procedure

354. Massey v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Pub. Safety and Corr. Servs., 886 A.2d 585, 602 (Md. 2005).
See also Evans v. State, 914 A.2d 25, 76-81 (Md. 2006) (recognizing that DPSCS and DOC are
subject to provisions of state Administrative Procedure Act, and that exemption exists for rules
that do not have “general application,” concern “only the internal management of DOC,” and do
not “directly affect the rights of the public,” but concluding that lethal injection protocol is not
exempt); Watkins v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Pub. Safety and Corr. Servs., 831 A.2d 1079, 1086 (Md.
2003) (“The Administrative Procedure Act governs our review of decisions of the Grievance
Office, an entity within the Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services.”).
355. Massey, 886 A.2d at 602.
356. Inmates are also members of the public and so prison disciplinary rules are subject to the
state Administrative Procedure Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 24.207(g) (West 2004). Martin
v. Dep’t of Corr., 384 N.W.2d 392 (Mich. 1986). See also Spruyette v. Owens, 475 N.W. 2d 382,
386 (Ct. App. Mich. 1991) (“Both this court and our Supreme Court have repeatedly held that the
Department of Corrections is an agency subject to the rule-making provisions of the act,” and so
hearing officer who acted based on an “improperly promulgated policy directive” was not entitled
to qualified immunity). But see Walen v. Dep’t of Corr., 505 N.W.2d 519 (Mich. 1993)
(concluding that FOIA applies to prison disciplinary proceedings despite the fact that the
legislature had exempted such hearings from the definition of “contested case” in some portions of
the Administrative Procedure Act, see MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 24.315(2) (West 2004)).
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does not include “rules of the commissioner
of corrections relating to the release,
placement, term, and supervision of inmates
serving a supervised release or conditional
release term, the internal management of
institutions under the commissioner’s
control, and rules adopted under section
609.105 governing the inmates of those
institutions.” 357
MISS. CODE ANN. § 25-43-1.102(i)(ii)(6)
(West 2006) (exempting from definition of
“rule” “[a] regulation or statement directly
related only to inmates of a correctional or
detention facility”). 358
Section 536.010(6)(k) of the Missouri Statute
exempts from the definition of “rule” a
“statement concerning only inmates of an
institution under the control of the
department of corrections and human
resources or the division of youth
services.” 359
MO. ANN. STAT. §
536.010(6)(k) (West 2008).
Mont. Dep’t of Corr., Policy No. 20.2.101
(Jan.
14,
2000),
available
at
http://www.mtrules.org/gateway/RuleNo.asp
?RN=20.2.101: “[T]he department of
corrections is exempt from the Montana
Administrative Procedure Act in the areas of
the supervision and administration of any

357. Weber v. Hvass, 626 N.W.2d 426 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (concluding that a rule
recovering the cost of confinement from inmates was exempt from the state Administrative
Procedure Act). See also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 14.03, subd. 2 (West 2005) (providing that “[t]he
contested case procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act . . . do not apply to . . . the
commissioner of corrections”).
358. Mississippi courts provide judicial review of some MDOC administrative decisions.
See, e.g., Horton v. Epps, No. 2008-CP-00430-COA, 2009 WL 1058631 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009)
(judicial review of determination regarding trustee status); Lyons v. Epps, No. 2007-CP-01194COA, 2009 WL 920633 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009) (judicial review of sentence computation denied
for failure to timely file appeal).
359. Middleton v. Mo. Dep’t of Corr., 278 S.W.3d 193 (Mo. 2009) (Lethal injection protocol
was exempt from provisions of state Administrative Procedure Act.) “In order for there to be a
‘contested case’ within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act, providing for judicial
review of an agency decision in a contested case, a prior hearing requirement must be imposed by
statute, municipal charter ordinance or constitutional provision.” State v. Brackman, 737 S.W.2d
516, 518 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (Prison adjustment committee is not an “agency” and its decision to
reclassify and transfer a prisoner was not a “contested case” subject to judicial review.).
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penal institution with regard to the
institutional supervision, custody, control,
care and treatment of youths or prisoners . . .
.”
MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-4-102(2)(a)(ii)
(2009): “‘Agency’ means an agency, as
defined in 2-3-102, of the state government
except that the provisions of this chapter do
not apply to the following: . . . the
supervision and administration of a penal
institution with regard to the institutional
supervision, custody, control, care, or
treatment of youths or prisoners.”
Bound by rulemaking procedures of
Nebraska Administrative Procedure Act,
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 84-901 to -920
(2008). 360
“The following agencies are entirely
exempted from the requirements of this
chapter: . . . the Department of Corrections . .
. .” NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 233B.039(1)(b)
(LexisNexis 2007).
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21-H:8 (LexisNexis
2008): “The commissioner shall . . . [a]dopt
all rules of the department, pursuant to RSA
541-A [Admin. Procedure Act], whether the
rulemaking authority delegated by the
legislature is granted to the commissioner,
the department or any administrative unit or
subordinate official of the department either
by this chapter or by existing statutes.” He
shall also “adopt such reasonable internal
practices and procedures, which shall not be
considered rules subject to the provisions of
RSA 541-A, as may be necessary to carry out
the duties of the department and its

360. Abdullah v. Gunter, 497 N.W.2d 12, 16 (Neb. 1993) (concluding that inmate’s claim that
policy was invalid because not properly promulgated in compliance with the Nebraska
Administrative Procedure Act was moot because the policy subsequently was promulgated in
accordance with the act). See also Dailey v. Neb. Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 578 N.W.2d 869 (1998)
(noting that judicial review of prison disciplinary hearings is provided under the state
Administrative Procedure Act, NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-4,123 (2008), although Administrative
Procedure Act rules do not apply to disciplinary proceedings themselves).
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divisions.” See also § 541-A:21(I)(j), (aa)
(LexisNexis 2006) (exempting from state
Administrative Procedure Act rules relative
“to credit for good conduct of prisoners” and
“to internal practices and procedures in the
department of corrections”). 361
N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 10A:1-1.5(a) (2009):
“Department of Corrections rules are
promulgated pursuant to the Administrative
Procedure Act, N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 et seq.,
and NJAC 1:30.” 362
State Rules Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-4-2
(LexisNexis 2003) states that the term rule
does “not include rules relating to the
management, confinement, discipline or
release of inmates of any penal or charitable
institution.” 363
The
New
Mexico
Administrative Procedure Act, N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 12-8-2(G)(3) (LexisNexis 1998), also
provides that the term “rule” does not pertain
to “regulations concerning only the
management, confinement, discipline or
release of inmates of state penal, correctional,
public health or mental institutions.”
The New York State Administrative
Procedure Act excludes “the state division of
parole and the department of correctional
services” from the definition of “agency,”

361. Knowles v. N.H. Dep’t of Corr. Comm’r, 538 F. Supp. 2d 453, 459 n.8 (D. N.H. 2008)
(“In 2007, the New Hampshire Legislature enacted a statutory scheme which exempted certain of
the DOC’s practices and procedures from the procedural requirements of the APA.”). The year
before this statutory revision, the New Hampshire Supreme Court had concluded that a 1994
recodification had repealed an exemption for DOC policies, except for those “relative to credit for
good conduct of prisoners,” an exception which included the disciplinary rules challenged in that
case. Gosselin v. N.H. Dep’t of Corr., 907 A.2d 944, 946-47 (N.H. 2006). The Gosselin court
interpreted Section 541-A:21 (I) to exempt authority granted under these provisions from both
rulemaking and adjudicatory requirements of the state Administrative Procedure Act. Id. at 947.
362. Hampton v. Dep’t of Corr., 765 A.2d 286 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (Regulations
regarding custody classification were invalid because not promulgated pursuant to state
Administrative Procedure Act.). See also Maqbool v. N.J. Dep’t of Corr., 2008 WL 2356687
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008) (judicial review of a classification decision); Lewis v. Dep’t of
Corr., 2007 WL 846335 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007) (judicial review of disciplinary
proceeding).
363. See also Lopez v. LeMaster, 61 P.3d 185 (N.M. 2002) (limiting judicial review of prison
disciplinary proceeding to constitutional due process violations); Johnson v. Francke, 734 P.2d
804 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987) (exempting disciplinary rules from state rules act).
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“except for purposes of article two of this
chapter.”
N.Y. A.P.A. LAW § 102(1)
(McKinney 2009).
Article 2 addresses
rulemaking procedures. § 201.
The New York State Administrative
Procedure Act exempts from the definition of
“rule” those rules “concerning the internal
management of the agency which do not
directly and significantly affect the rights of
or procedures or practices available to the
public.” § 102.2(b)(i).
However, this exception has been interpreted
not to constitute an exemption for rules
affecting prisoners in Jones v. Smith, 478
N.E.2d 191, 191 (1985) (Disciplinary rules
are not exempt from provisions of State
Administrative Procedure Act, because
regulations that affect a prisoner’s liberty
interest are not matters of “organization” or
“internal management,” and because
prisoners were the members of the “general
public” over which the Department exercises
“direct authority”). 364
Many administrative decisions of the N.Y.
Dept. of Corrections, including prison
disciplinary hearings, are reviewed under
“Article 78” proceedings, N.Y. C.P.L.R.
7803 (Consol. 2008). 365
North
Carolina

Express
exemption from
rulemaking

Section 150B-1(d)(6) of the North Carolina
Statute exempts from rulemaking: “The
Department of Correction, with respect to
matters relating solely to persons in its
custody or under its supervision, including
prisoners, probationers, and parolees.” N.C.

364. See also McAllister v. Jones, 514 N.Y.S.2d 532 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (Failure to file a
rule with the Secretary of State precluded basing a disciplinary procedure on it.). But see Ciotoli
v. Goord, 683 N.Y.S.2d 683, 685 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (Because disciplinary rules regarding
prisoner drug testing were “flexible” rather than “fixed” rules of “general principle,” they were not
required to be filed with the Secretary of State); Abreu v. Coughlin, 555 N.Y.S.2d 889 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1990) (Urinalysis procedure form was not a “rule” within the meaning of the state
Administrative Procedure Act.); Baker v. Scully, 550 N.Y.S.2d 365 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (Time
card rules and regulations need not be filed with Secretary of State).
365. Thanks to John Boston for sharing information about New York.
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GEN. STAT. § 150B-1(d)(6) (2007). Section
150B-1(e)(7) also exempts the Department of
Correction from the “contested case”
provision of the state Administrative
Procedure Act.
“A rule concerning only inmates of a
correctional or detention facility” is
exempted
from
the
North
Dakota
Administrative Agencies Practice Act, N.D.
CENT. CODE § 28-32-01(11)(f) (1991). 366 It
also exempts from the definition of “agency”
the “department of corrections and
rehabilitation except with respect to the
activities of the division of adult services
under chapter 54-23.4 [crime victims
compensation fund],” § 28-32-01(2)(m)
(Supp. 2009).
Administrative regulations are subject to
promulgation under Ohio Code, OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 119.03 (LexisNexis 2007),
according to the Notice Procedure 5120:2-101. Policy Directives may be promulgated
by the Commissioner, see Ohio Dep’t of
Rehab. and Corr., Department Directive 01COM-01,
available
at
http://www.drc.ohio.gov/web/drc_policies/do
cuments/01-COM-01.pdf. 367
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 250.4(A)(10)
(West Supp. 2009): “The Department of
Corrections, State Board of Corrections,
county sheriffs and managers of city jails
shall be exempt from Article I of the
Administrative Procedures Act with respect
to . . . prescribing internal management
procedures for the management of the state

366. See Jensen v. Little, 459 N.W.2d 237, 239 (N.D. 1990) (“[W]e believe the Penitentiary’s
disciplinary rules promulgated under the Director of Institutions are exempt from the procedures
of the Administrative Agencies Practice Act.”).
367. See State v. Brown, 804 N.E.2d 1021, 1023 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004) (“This court has
specifically found that the ODRC is not an agency whose decisions are subject to judicial review
by appeal pursuant to RC 119.12.”). But see Linger v. Ohio Adult Parole Authority, No.
97APE04-482, 1997 WL 638411, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (“Appellant is correct that some
functions of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction are subject to R.C. Chapter
119 [judicial review provisions of the state APA].”).
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prisons, county jails and city jails and for the
management, supervision and control of all
incarcerated prisoners.” 368
Policy on Rules Development, No. 291-0010020, says that the DOC adopted the AG’s
Model Rules of Procedure under the
Administrative Procedure Act pursuant to
ORS 183.341, and provides a list of agencies
to which proposed rules are sent. 369 But
section 183.335(3)(c) of the Oregon Statute
provides that “the Department of Corrections
and the State Board of Parole and Post-Prison
Supervision may adopt rules limiting
participation by inmates in the proposed
adoption, amendment or repeal of any rule to
written submissions.” OR. REV. STAT. §
183.335(3)(c) (2007).
Weaver v. Dep’t of Corr., 720 A.2d 178 (Pa.
Cmlth. 1998) (rejecting claim that inmate
medical services co-pay regulations were
invalid, concluding that the Department of
Corrections
had
complied
with
Commonwealth Documents Law and the
Regulatory Review Act; noting the
distinction between agency regulations that
must be promulgated through rulemaking and
policies, which need not). 370
Subject to Administrative Procedure Act, R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 42-35-3 (2007), but there are
exemptions because the term “rule” does not

368. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 250.4(B)(11) (West 2008): further exempts from Article II
of the state Administrative Procedure Act, which deals with individual adjudication, “[t]he
supervisory or administrative agency of any penal, mental, medical or eleemosynary institution,
only with respect to the institutional supervision, custody, control, care or treatment of inmates,
prisoners or patients therein.” See Canady v. Reynolds, 880 P.2d 391, 398 (Okla. Crim. App.
1994) (concluding that prisoner cannot appeal loss of good time credits through state
Administrative Procedure Act, but that relief may be available through habeas corpus).
369. See Kellas v. DOC, 145 P.3d 139 (Or. 2006) (Oregon Supreme Court concluded that
father of prisoner possessed standing under section 183.400 of the Oregon Statute to file petition
for review challenging application of rules regarding credit for time son had served on house
arrest.).
370. Chimenti v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 720 A.2d 205, 211 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1998) (Rule
regarding monitoring of inmate phone calls was a policy statement and not a “regulation” within
the meaning of the Pennsylvania Administrative Procedure Act.). See also Richardson v. Beard,
942 A.2d 911, 913 (Pa. Commw. 2008) (A prisoner could file a petition for review of DOC policy
without first filing grievance because he was not raising federal claims.).
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include “(1) statements concerning only the
internal management of an agency and not
affecting private rights or procedures
available to the public, or (2) declaratory
rulings issued pursuant to Section 42-35-8,
(3) intra-agency memoranda, or (4) an
order.” 371 § 42-35-1(8).
S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-10(4) (2005)
(exempting from the definition of
“regulation” orders “of the supervisory or
administrative agency of a penal, mental, or
medical institution, in respect to the
institutional supervision, custody, control,
care, or treatment of inmates, prisoners, or
patients”). 372
Rules affecting inmate disciplinary matters
are exempt from the definition of “rule.”
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 1-26-1(8)(g)
(2004). 373
See also § 1-15-20 (“The
Department of Corrections at any time may
promulgate rules, pursuant to chapter 1-26
[state Administrative Procedure Act],
concerning: (1) Public contact with inmates
through telephone and mail services and
visits; (2) Inmate release date calculations;
(3) Standards for parole supervision and
parolee contact; (4) Federal and out-of-state
inmates housed in state correctional facilities;
and (5) Inmate accounts. The department
may prescribe departmental policies and
procedures for the management of its
institutions and agencies, including inmate
disciplinary matters. Inmate disciplinary
matters consist of all matters relating to

371. L’Heureux v. State Dep’t of Corr., 708 A.2d 549, 553 (R.I. 1998) (“[T]he APA is not
applicable to classification proceedings, disciplinary proceedings, or rule making dealing with the
internal affairs of the ACI by the DOC.”); Johnson v. State, No. 99-1007, 2002 WL 1803931 (R.I.
Super. Ct. 2002) (Administrative Procedure Act did not apply to method for calculating good time
under internal management exception).
372. But see Al-Shabazz v. State, 527 S.E.2d 742, 758 (S.C. 2000) (Although prison
disciplinary hearings are not subject to all Administrative Procedure Act provisions, prisoners may
obtain judicial review under the act.)
373. Inmates are also excluded from procedures for petitioning an agency to promulgate,
amend, or repeal a rule, § 1-26-13, or for petitioning an agency for a declaratory ruling, § 1-26-15.
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individual inmate behavior and to all matters
relating to the maintenance of order, control,
and safety within any institution under the
supervision
of
the
Department
of
Corrections.”).
“Statements concerning inmates of a
correctional or detention facility” are exempt
from the UAPA, TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-5102(10)(G) (2005). Section 4-5-106(b) also
exempts “[d]isciplinary and job termination
proceedings for inmates” from the definition
of “contested case.” 374 § 4-5-106(b).
Administrative Procedure Act states: “This
chapter does not apply to a rule or internal
procedure of the Texas Department of
Criminal Justice or Texas Board of Criminal
Justice that applies to an inmate or any other
person under the custody or control of the
department or to an action taken under that
rule or procedure.” TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN.
§ 2001.226 (Vernon 2008).
UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-13-10(2) (2008)
(“[t]he department may make rules in
accordance with Title 63G, Chapter 3, Utah
Administrative Rulemaking Act, to carry out
the provisions of this chapter.”).
Title 3, section 831(a) of the Vermont Statute
does not exempt the Vermont Department of
Corrections from rulemaking procedures. 375
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 831(a) (2003).
VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-4002(B) (2008)
(“Agency action relating to the following

374. Abdur’rahman v. Bredesen, 181 S.W.3d 292 (Tenn. 2005); Mandela v. Campbell, 978
S.W.2d 531, 535 (Tenn. 1998) (Disciplinary policies and procedures are exempt from
requirements of Tennesee Uniform Administrative Procedures Act.). See also Clark v. Rose, 183
S.W.3d 669, 674 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (noting that although inmate disciplinary proceedings are
exempt from review under the UAPA, non-disciplinary actions may be reviewed under the
statute).
375. Parker v. Gorczyk, 787 A.2d 494 (Vt. 2001) (concluding that furlough policy generally
applicable to prisoners was not exempt from rulemaking procedures). Contra King v. Gorczyk,
825 A.2d 16 (Vt. 2003) (policy directive regarding “random inmate drug testing” did not
constitute a “rule” subject to the requirements of the Vermont Administrative Procedure Act
because it did not “affect or alter the individual rights and obligations of plaintiff”). These
decisions provided judicial review under Vermont Rules of Civil Procedure 74 and 75,
respectively.
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subjects shall be exempted from the
provisions of [the Administrative Procedure
Act][:] . . . [i]nmates of prisons or other such
facilities or parolees therefrom . . . [and] [t]he
custody of persons in, or sought to be placed
in, mental, penal or other state institutions as
well as the treatment, supervision, or
discharge of such persons.”). 376
Wash. Dep’t of Corr., Policy Development
and Implementation, DOC 100.100 (Aug. 17,
2009),
available
at
http://www.doc.wa.gov/policies/showFile.asp
x?name=100100; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
34.05.030 (West 2003) (“This chapter shall
not apply to . . . [t]he department of
corrections or the indeterminate sentencing
review board with respect to persons who are
in their custody or are subject to the
jurisdiction of those agencies.”).
Section 29A-1-3(c) of the West Virginia
Code provides that the provisions of the state
Administrative Procedure Act “do not apply
to rules relating to or contested cases
involving the conduct of inmates or other
persons admitted to public institutions. . . .
Such rules shall be filed in the state register
in the form prescribed by this chapter and be
effective upon filing.” W. VA. CODE ANN. §
29A-1-3(c) (LexisNexis 2007). But see § 3120-9(a)(2) (LexisNexis 2003) (providing that
the Jail Standards Commission promulgate
legislative rules under West Virginia
Administrative Procedure Act to implement

376. See also Porter v. Commonwealth., 661 S.E. 2d 415, 432-33 (Va. 2008) (concluding that
Virginia execution procedures were not subject to Virginia Administrative Procedure Act because
“the Virginia Department of Corrections is an agency whose sole purpose is related to inmates of
prisons,” and “is thus exempt from the strictures of the APA”). However, the Virginia
Department of Corrections has promulgated “public participation guidelines” for rulemaking
regarding non-exempt provisions, including provision for a notification list, public hearings,
regulatory advisory panels, petitions for rulemaking, and public comment. See 6 VA. ADMIN.
CODE § 15-11-10 et seq (2009).
377. State ex rel. White v. Parsons, 483 S.E.2d 1, 10 (W. Va. 1997) (concluding that Jail
Correctional Facilities Standards Commission had failed to adequately consider the views of the
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minimum standards for jails). 377
Rules adopting procedures for good time
forfeiture were invalid unless promulgated
pursuant to the Administrative Procedure
Act, WIS. STAT. ANN. § 227.01 (West 2009),
because they were rules of general
applicability. State ex rel. Clifton v. Young,
394 N.W.2d 769, 772-73 (Wis. App.
1986). 378
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 25-1-105(a) (2009):
“The department of corrections shall adopt
rules and regulations necessary to carry out
its functions.
The promulgation of
substantive rules by the department, the
conduct of its hearings and its final decisions
are specifically exempt from all provisions of
the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act
including the provisions for judicial review. .
. . The department’s rules shall be filed in
the office of the secretary of state.”

Commissioner of Corrections in promulgating a complete ban on tobacco products at jail
facilities).
378. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 227.03(4) (West 2009) provides: “The provisions of this chapter
relating to contested cases do not apply to . . . proceeding[s] involving the care and treatment of a
resident or an inmate of a correctional institution.”

